Sherlock Holmes and the Problem of the Dead Hand: The Modification and Termination of  Irrevocable  Trusts by Ausness, Richard C.
University of Kentucky
UKnowledge
Law Faculty Scholarly Articles Law Faculty Publications
2015
Sherlock Holmes and the Problem of the Dead
Hand: The Modification and Termination of
"Irrevocable" Trusts
Richard C. Ausness
University of Kentucky College of Law, rausness@uky.edu
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/law_facpub
Part of the Estates and Trusts Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Faculty Publications at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law
Faculty Scholarly Articles by an authorized administrator of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Richard C. Ausness, Sherlock Holmes and the Problem of the Dead Hand: The Modification and Termination of "Irrevocable" Trusts, 28
Quinnipiac Pro. L.J. 237 (2015).
AUSNESS.MACRO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/20/15 3:19 PM 
 
 
QUINNIPIAC PROBATE 
LAW JOURNAL 
 
VOLUME 28 2015     NUMBER 3 
 
SHERLOCK HOLMES AND THE PROBLEM OF THE 
DEAD HAND: THE MODIFICIATION AND 
TERMINATION OF “IRREVOCABLE” TRUSTS 
RICHARD C. AUSNESS* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
I must confess that Sherlock Holmes will not appear in this 
Article.1  The use of the eminent detective’s name in the title is 
nothing more than an underhanded attempt on my part to induce 
potential readers to test the murky waters of American trust law.  
However, unlike Mr. Holmes, the “Dead Hand” will appear with some 
frequency, principally in the form of long-dead ancestors who hope to 
continue exercising control over trust property at the expense of their 
living descendants. 
In short, this Article is about the modification and termination 
of so-called “irrevocable” trusts.  A trust may be made irrevocable at 
the time of its creation or it may become so at a later time.  A 
testamentary trust is one that is embodied in a will and becomes 
effective at the testator’s death.  Since the testator will be dead by the 
time the trust becomes effective, he2 will not be in a position to modify 
                                                   
* Associate Dean for Faculty Research and Everett Metcalf, Jr., Professor of Law, University 
of Kentucky College of Law; B.A. 1966, J.D. 1968 University of Florida; LL.M. Yale Law 
School.  
 1  This is not to say that the famous sleuth was unfamiliar with trusts and estates matters.  
Some of his most celebrated cases involved inheritance and other donative transfers of one 
sort or another.  See Stephen R. Alton, The Game Is Afoot!: The Significance of Donative 
Transfers in the Sherlock Holmes Canon, 46 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 125 (2011). 
2  Of course, I realize that settlors, testators, beneficiaries, and trustees are female, as well 
as male.  However, the constant use of “he, she or it” and similar phrases would make for 
very awkward writing.  Consequently, and with all due respect to the female half of the 
human species, I have adopted the traditional, and possibly outdated, convention of using 
“his” or “him” to refer include not only members of the opposite sex, as well as corporate 
fiduciaries who, unlike ships, are not affiliated with any particular gender. 
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or revoke it.3  For the same reason, a revocable trust will become 
irrevocable when the settlor dies4 or when the power to revoke is 
released.  Finally, an inter vivos trust may be irrevocable when it is 
first created if the settlor disclaims the right to revoke or modify the 
trust.5  Although these types of trusts are irrevocable as far as the 
settlor is concerned, they can sometimes be modified or terminated by 
others.  This Article will examine the various ways in which 
irrevocable trusts can be modified or terminated.  It will also consider 
the potential conflicts that may arise when beneficiaries desire to 
terminate the trust prematurely or change its terms in some 
significant way. 
Part II analyzes the traditional rules regarding the 
modification and termination of irrevocable trusts.  In most cases, 
judicial approval is required.  The discussion of termination focuses 
on the Claflin Doctrine, which is widely followed in the United 
States.6  According to this doctrine, a court will not authorize 
termination if a material purpose of the trust has not been 
accomplished.7  This requirement effectively prevents discretionary, 
spendthrift, and support trusts from being terminated, as well as 
those which postpone vesting or distribution until the beneficiaries 
reach a certain age.8  On the other hand, modification of the 
administrative provisions of a trust may be permitted under the 
equitable deviation doctrine if unforeseen circumstances threaten to 
defeat or substantially impair the accomplishment of trust purposes.9  
                                                   
 3  See Tara M. Niendorf, Save the Wealth!  Trust Decanting and Oklahoma, 66 OKLA. L. 
REV. 615, 620 (2014); Charles Epps Ipock, A Judicial and Economic Analysis of Attorney’s 
Fees in Trust Litigation and the Resulting Inequitable Treatment of Trust Beneficiaries, 43 
ST. MARY’S L.J. 855, 863 (2012). 
 4  See Philip J. Ruce, The Trustee and the Spendthrift: The Argument Against Small Trust 
Termination, 48 GONZ. L. REV. 163, 175 (2012-13). 
 5  See Cheryl Swack, The Balanchine Trust: Dancing Through the Steps of Two-Part 
Licensing, 6 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 265, 270 (1999); Lauren Z. Curry, Agents in Secrecy: 
The Use of Information Surrogates in Trust Administration, 64 VAND. L. REV. 925, 927 
(2011); Samuel R. Scarcello, Transfer Taxes in Flux: A Comparison of Alternative Plans for 
GRAT Reform, 107 NW. U.L. REV. 321, 323 n.7 (2012). 
 6  Claflin v. Claflin, 149 Mass. 19, 20 N.E. 454 (1889). See Joshua C. Tate, Conditional Love: 
Incentive Trusts and the Inflexibility Problem, 41 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 445, 467 (2006) 
[hereinafter Conditional Love]. 
 7  See, e.g., Trabits v. First Nat’l Bank of Mobile, 295 Ala. 85, 90, 323 So.2d 353, 357 (1975) 
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 337(2) (1959)); Carnahan v. Johnson, 711 
N.E.2d 1093, 1097 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (citing In re Trust of Grant, 5th Dist. Stark  No. CA-
6122, (Sept. 26, 1984) (unreported); Closset v. Burtchaell, 112 Or. 585, 597, 230 P. 554, 558 
(1924); Hurley v. Moody Nat’l Bank of Galveston, 98 S.W.3d 307, 311-12 (Tex. App. 2003); 
Frost Nat’l Bank of San Antonio v. Newton, 554 S.W.2d 149, 154 (Tex. 1977); Bussell v. 
Wright, 133 Wis. 445, 113 N.W. 644, 646-47 (1907). 
 8  See Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, The Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 50 UCLA L. 
REV. 1303, 1328 (2002-03). 
 9  In re Stephen L. Chapman Irrevocable Trust Agreement, 953 N.E.2d 573, 580 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2011). 
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In addition, a few courts have extended the equitable deviation 
doctrine to permit modification of a trust’s distributive provisions.10  
Nevertheless, it is still fairly difficult to modify or terminate a trust 
under the traditional regime. 
Part III examines various provisions of the Uniform Trust 
Code (the “Code”) and the Restatement (Third) of Trusts (the 
“Restatement”) that loosen some of the traditional restrictions on 
trust modification and termination.  For example, the Code permits a 
court to terminate a trust if, due to unforeseen circumstances, 
termination would further the purposes of the trust.11  The 
Restatement goes even further, allowing a court to disregard the 
material purpose requirement if it determines that the reasons for 
termination outweigh the material purpose of the trust.12  The Code 
and the Restatement also relax some of the traditional rules on 
modification.  For example, the Code declares that a court may modify 
a trust’s distributive provisions when necessary to further its 
purposes.13  In addition, the Code permits a court to modify a trust’s 
administrative provisions without regard to changed circumstances if 
it concludes that retaining the original trust provisions would be 
impracticable, wasteful, or would impair administration of the trust.14  
The Restatement also relaxes the equitable deviation doctrine’s 
material purpose requirement by allowing a court to modify a trust if 
it finds that the benefits of the proposed modification outweigh the 
material purposes of the trust.15 
Part IV describes how the settlor can authorize modification or 
termination of the trust in the trust instrument itself rather than 
relying on the courts.  One alternative is to give the trustee the power 
to terminate or modify the trust.16  Another popular technique is 
“decanting,” which involves empowering the trustee to transfer trust 
property to another trust.17  Because the second trust may have 
different administrative and distributive provisions than the original 
trust, decanting is a backhanded method of modifying a trust.18  A 
large number of states have now enacted legislation to allow 
                                                   
 10  See Petition of Wolcott, 95 N.H. 23, 56 A.2d 641 (1948). 
 11  UNIF. TRUST CODE § 412(a) (2013).  
 12  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 65(2) (2003). 
 13  UNIF. TRUST CODE § 412(a). 
 14  Id. § 412(b). 
 15  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 65(2). 
 16  UNIF. TRUST CODE § 808(c) (2013).  
 17  See S. Alan Medlin, The South Carolina Probate Code Patched and Refurbished: Version 
2013, 6 EST. PLAN. & CMTY. PROP. L. J. 81, 94 (2013-14). 
 18  Melissa J. Willms, Decanting Trusts: Irrevocable, Not Unchangeable, 6 EST. PLAN. & 
CMTY. PROP. L. J. 35, 37 (2013-14). 
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decanting.19  Finally, the settlor can appoint a trust protector and vest 
him with the power to modify or terminate the trust.20 
Finally, Part V discusses the potential conflicts between the 
interests of deceased settlors and living beneficiaries, an issue that 
often arises when the beneficiaries seek to modify or terminate the 
trust.  Recently, this problem has become more acute as a growing 
number of states have abolished or modified the traditional Rule 
Against Perpetuities in a way that permits settlors to create perpetual 
or “dynasty” trusts that may endure for many generations.21  In an 
attempt to strike a reasonable balance between the rights of the 
deceased settlor (the dead hand) and those of the living beneficiaries, 
I propose that the first generation of trust beneficiaries (typically the 
settlor’s children) continue to be subject to the usual requirements for 
modifying or terminating a trust.  This would ensure that the settlor’s 
intent is respected for at least one generation.  However, second- and 
subsequent-generation beneficiaries – where permitted by state law – 
could modify or terminate the trust without court approval. 
II. TRADITIONAL RULES CONCERNING THE TERMINATION 
AND MODIFICATION OF IRREVOCABLE TRUSTS 
A.  Termination 
Under the traditional rules, a trust may be terminated in 
various ways.22  For example, if it is expressly limited in duration, it 
will terminate at the expiration date.23  In addition, a trust will 
terminate when all of the trust purposes have been accomplished.24  A 
trust will also terminate by merger if the beneficiary also acquires 
legal title to the trust property.25  Moreover, a trust may terminate if 
                                                   
 19  See Niendorf, supra note 3, at 622-23. 
 20  Thomas E. Simmons, Decanting and Its Alternatives: Remodeling and Revamping 
Irrevocable Trusts, 55 S.D. L. REV. 253, 270 (2010). 
 21  Diana S.C. Zeydel, Developing Law on Changing Irrevocable Trusts: Staying Out of the 
Danger Zone, 47 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L .J. 1, 2 (2012). 
 22  See Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Steinitz, 288 Ill. App. 3d 926, 932, 681 N.E.2d 669, 674 
(1997); Hamel v. Hamel, 296 Kan. 1060, 1068, 299 P.3d 278, 284 (2013). 
 23  See La Salle Nat’l Bank v. MacDonald, 2 Ill.2d 581, 587, 119 N.E.2d 266, 269 (Ill. 1954). 
 24  See Brine v. Paine Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 745 F.2d 100, 104 (1st Cir. 1984); 
Beach v. Oneida Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Cnt. N.Y., 206 F.Supp. 508, 511 (N.D.N.Y. 1961); 
Clement v. Charlotte Hospital Ass’n, Inc., 137 So. 2d 615, 617 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962); 
Matter of Estate of Stephan, 566 N.E.2d 1084, 1086 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991); Papale-Keefe v. 
Altomare, 38 Mass. App. Ct. 308, 314, 647 N.E.2d 722, 726 (1995); First Am. Nat’l Bank v. 
Cole, 211 Tenn. 213, 222, 364 S.W.2d 875, 878 (1963); Clayton v. Behle, 565 P.2d 1132, 1133 
(Utah 1977).  A trust that is allowed to continue after its intended purposes have been 
accomplished is known as a “wasting trust.”  Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 
446-47, 119 S.Ct. 755, 764 (1999); Bennett v. Conrail Matched Savings Plan Admin. Comm., 
168 F.3d 671, 679 n.7 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 25  See In re Saber, 233 B.R. 547, 553 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1999). 
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the purposes of the trust have become unlawful, contrary to public 
policy, or impossible to achieve.26  Furthermore, a trust can be 
terminated if the settlor and all of the beneficiaries agree to it.  
Finally, a court may terminate a trust with the consent of all of the 
beneficiaries, provided that termination will not be contrary to a 
material purpose of the trust.27 
1. Agreement by the Settlor and Beneficiaries 
A court can terminate a trust if the settlor and all of the 
beneficiaries (if they are sui juris) request judicial termination, even if 
the trustee objects and the trust purposes are not yet fully 
accomplished.28  This rule applies even when the trust in question is a 
spendthrift trust.29  Of course, this rule will not allow a court to 
terminate a trust when unborn or undetermined beneficiaries have 
not joined in the petition to terminate.30  This exception is nicely 
illustrated in DuPont v. Equitable Security Trust Co.31 
In 1929, Hallock DuPont created an irrevocable inter vivos 
trust in connection with a pending divorce from his wife, Elizabeth.32  
The trust instrument was very complex, but essentially was intended 
to provide for Elizabeth and the settlor’s two-year-old daughter, Eve.33  
However, Hallock also retained a reversion if Eve died without 
surviving issue.34  Elizabeth remarried and died in 1942.35  In 1954, 
Hallock and Eve informed the trustee that they were “revoking” the 
                                                   
 26  F. Ladson Boyle, When It’s Broke — Fix It: Reforming Irrevocable Trusts to Change Tax 
Consequences, 53 TAX LAW. 821, 824 (1999-2000). 
 27  See In re Estate of Harbaugh, 231 Kan. 564, 569, 646 P.2d 498, 503 (1982); Am. Nat’l 
Bank v. Miller, 899 P.2d 1337, 1340-41 (Wyo. 1995). 
 28  See Peck v. Peck, 133 So. 3d 587, 588-589 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014); Preston v. City Nat’l 
Bank, 294 So. 2d 11, 14 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Botzum v. Havana Nat’l Bank, 367 Ill. 
539, 542, 12 N.E.2d 203, 205 (1937); Ludlow’s Trustee v. Ludlow, 249 Ky. 396, 398, 60 
S.W.2d 965, 966 (1933); Mahan v. Mahan, 320 Md. 262, 276, 577 A.2d 70, 77 (1990); Hein v. 
Hein, 214 Mich. App. 356, 359, 543 N.W.2d 19, 20 (1995); In re Zinke’s Trust, 83 N.Y.S.2d 
813, 814 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1948); O’Brien v. Holden, 104 Vt. 338, 347, 160 A. 192, 196 (1932); 
Fowler v. Lanpher, 193 Wash. 308, 318, 75 P.2d 132, 137 (1938); see also RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 338(1) (1959); Boyle, supra note 26, at 823.  
 29  See Preston v. City Nat’l Bank, 294 So. 2d 11, 14 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Hein v. Hein, 
214 Mich. App. 356, 359, 543 N.W.2d 19, 20 (1995); Musick v. Reynolds, 798 S.W.2d 626, 
629 (Tex. App. 1990) (citing Sayers v. Baker, 171 S.W.2d 547 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943)). 
 30  See Levy v. Crocker-Citizens Nat’l Bank, 14 Cal.App.3d 102, 105, 94 Cal. Rptr. 1, 3 
(1971); Sawyer v. Sawyer, 261 Iowa 112, 121, 152 N.W.2d 605, 611 (1967); In re Kamerly’s 
Estate, 348 Pa. 225, 227, 35 A.2d 258, 259 (1944) (internal citations omitted); In re Bowers’ 
Trust Estate, 346 Pa. 85, 87, 29 A.2d 519, 520 (1943); In re Lewis’ Estate, 231 Pa. 60, 62, 79 
A. 921, 922 (1911). 
 31  35 Del. Ch. 261, 115 A.2d 482 (1955). 
 32  Id. at 262, 115 A.2d at 483. 
 33  Id. 
 34  Id. at 265, 115 A.2d at 485. 
 35  Id. at 263, 115 A.2d at 484. 
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trust, alleging that they were the only remaining persons with an 
interest in the trust property.36  When the trustee refused to return 
the trust corpus, Hallock and Eve sought judicial termination of the 
trust.37  Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, the court appointed a 
guardian ad litem to represent the interests of Eve’s minor children.38  
The guardian sided with the trustee, and opposed termination of the 
trust.39 
At issue was the nature of Eve’s children in the trust.  The 
trust instrument stated in considerable detail who would get the trust 
corpus if: (1) Eve predeceased Elizabeth, leaving lawful issue who 
survived Elizabeth, or (2) Eve predeceased Elizabeth, leaving lawful 
issue who did not survive Elizabeth.40  What the trust instrument did 
not do was specify what would happen if Eve survived Elizabeth and 
died, leaving lawful issue.41  This led the court to invoke the “gift by 
implication” doctrine,42 concluding that the trust’s overall scheme of 
distribution indicated that the settlor wanted to provide for his 
grandchildren if Eve outlived Elizabeth.43  Accordingly, the court 
ruled that a remainder in favor of Eve’s children was implied in the 
trust instrument.44  Since Eve’s children did not join in the plaintiffs’ 
request to terminate the trust, the court refused to terminate the 
trust since essential parties had withheld their consent.45 
2. Termination by Beneficiaries without the Settlor’s Consent 
In some cases, the beneficiaries of a trust can compel its 
termination when the settlor is dead and, thus, unable to consent to 
the trust’s termination.   In theory, it is not necessary for the 
beneficiaries to obtain a court decree if the requirements for trust 
termination are met.46  However, the trustee will often force the 
parties to seek judicial approval of a proposed termination.47 
                                                   
 36  Dupont, at 263, 115 A.2d at 484. 
 37  Id.  
 38  Id. 
 39  Id. 
 40  Id. at 269-270, 115 A.2d at 487. 
 41  DuPont, at 270, 115 A.2d at 488. 
 42  For a discussion of this doctrine, see Pamela R. Champine, My Will Be Done: 
Accommodating the Erring and Atypical Testator, 80 NEB. L. REV. 450, 454 n.229 (2001); 
Andrea W. Cornelison, Dead Man Talking: Are Courts Ready to Listen? The Erosion of the 
Plain Meaning Rule, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 820, 825-26 (2001); John H. Langbein & 
Lawrence W. Waggoner, Reformation of Wills on the Ground of Mistake: Change in Direction 
in American Law?, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 530, 538-41 (1981-82). 
 43  DuPont, 35 Del. Ch. at 274, 115 A.2d at 490. 
 44  Id. 
 45  Id.  
 46  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 65, general cmt. a. 
 47  Id. 
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a. The English Rule 
Since the 1841 decision of Saunders v. Vautier,48 English 
courts permit termination of a trust with the consent of all of the 
beneficiaries.49  In that case, the testator placed a large amount of 
East India Company stock into a testamentary trust and directed the 
trustee to distribute it to the settlor’s great nephew, Daniel, when he 
reached the age of twenty-five.  However, Daniel brought suit to 
terminate the trust when he reached the age of majority.  Since 
Daniel’s interest was indefeasibly vested, the Chancery Court ruled 
that he was entitled to demand the trust property when he reached 
the age of twenty-one.  The court reasoned that a trust should be 
indestructible only until the beneficiary became legally competent.50 
b. The Claflin Doctrine and the Material Purpose Requirement 
The Saunders decision was generally followed in the United 
States until the emergence of the Claflin Doctrine in the late 
nineteenth century.51   According to the Claflin Doctrine, a trust 
cannot be terminated unless all of the beneficiaries consent and early 
termination will not defeat a “material purpose” of the trust.52  On the 
other hand, the converse of this is also true: the beneficiaries of a 
trust may compel the termination if all of the material purposes of the 
trust have been achieved.53 
                                                   
 48  (1841) 49 Eng. Rep. 282 (Ch.) 
 49  See, e.g., In re Couturier, [1907] 1 Ch. 470; In re Jacob’s Will, (1861) 54 Eng. Rep. 683; 
Gosling v. Gosling, (1859) 70 Eng. Rep. 426; Rocke v. Rocke, (1845) 50 Eng.Rep. 267.  In 
addition, the Variation of Trusts Act, 1958, 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, c. 53 § 1 (a-d) (Eng.) now gives the 
English courts considerable discretion to modify or terminate trusts even when some of the 
beneficiaries are unknown or unborn.  See also Daniel B. Kelly, Restricting Testamentary 
Freedom: Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 1125, 1176-77 (2013-
2014); Unconditional Love, supra note 6, at 468-469. 
 50  Ronald Chester, Modification and Termination of Trusts in the 21st Century: The 
Uniform Trust Code Leads a Quiet Revolution, 35 REAL PROP. PROB & TR. J. 704, 709-10 
(2000-01). 
 51  See Thomas P. Gallanis, The New Direction of American Trust Law, 97 IOWA L. REV. 215, 
227 (2011).  However, a few courts have continued to follow Saunders.  See Spooner v. 
Dunlap, 87 N.H. 384, 180 A. 256 (1935); Newlin v. Girard Trust Co., 116 N.J. Eq. 498, 502, 
174 A. 479, 481 (1934). 
 52  See Steele v. Kelley, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 712, 733, 710 N.E.2d 973, 989 (1999).  The party 
requesting that the trust be terminated has the burden of showing that termination will not 
be contrary to the material purposes of the trust.  See In re Estate of Somers, 277 Kan. 761, 
769, 89 P.3d 898, 905 (2004); In re Tufford’s Trust, 275 Minn. 66, 71, 145 N.W.2d 59, 63-64 
(1966). 
 53  See In re Estate of Harbaugh, 231 Kan. 564, 568, 646 P.2d 498, 502 (1982); Bennett v. 
Tower Grove Bank & Trust Co., 434 S.W.2d 560, 563, 1968 (Mo. 1968); In re Bassett’s 
Estate, 104 N.H. 504, 508, 190 A.2d 415, 417-18 (1963); Estate of Weeks, 485 Pa. 329, 333, 
402 A.2d 657, 658-59 (1979); Am. Nat’l. Bank v. Miller, 899 P.2d 1337, 1340, 1995 Wyo. 
LEXIS 129 at *8 (Wyo. 1995). 
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This rule originated in Claflin v. Claflin,54 an 1889 decision by 
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.  In that case, the 
settlor, Wilbur Claflin, placed one-third of the residue of his estate in 
trust to pay the proceeds to his son, Adelbert, over a period of time.55  
The will directed Wilbur’s trustee to pay Adelbert $10,000 at age 
twenty-one, $10,000 at age twenty-five, and the balance when he 
reached age thirty.56  Several years after he reached the age of 
twenty-one, Adelbert sought to terminate the trust and receive the 
remaining trust property.57  Rejecting the English court’s ruling in 
Saunders, the Claflin court held that the settlor’s wishes must be 
carried out, declaring that “a testator has a right to dispose of his own 
property with such restrictions and limitations, not repugnant to law, 
as he sees fit, and that his intentions [should] be carried out, unless 
they contravene some positive rule of law, or are against public 
policy.”58 
Following the Claflin Doctrine, most American courts refuse to 
terminate a trust if its “material purposes” are not fully 
accomplished.59  As one commentator pointed out, “[t]he material 
purpose rule reflects a policy judgment that the settlor’s ‘intentions 
ought to be carried out.’”60  The Restatement (Second) of Trusts 
section 337(2) adopted the material purpose restriction for 
terminating trusts, declaring “[i]f the continuance of the trust is 
necessary to carry out a material purpose of the trust, the 
beneficiaries cannot compel its termination.”61 
Hurley v. Moody National Bank of Galveston62 illustrates the 
material purpose concept.  In her will, Mathilde Hurley bequeathed 
$50,000 each to her two children, Paulette Hilton and James Hurley, 
and placed the rest of her estate in trust for the benefit of Paulette’s 
son, Nathan.63  The trustee was authorized to spend as much of the 
trust income as necessary for Nathan’s education.64  Furthermore, the 
trust instrument provided that the trust would terminate when 
Nathan reached the age of thirty-five or when the trustee determined 
                                                   
54  149 Mass. 19, 20, 20 N.E. 454, 455 (1889). 
 55  Id.  
 56  Id. at 21, 20 N.E. at 455. 
57  Id.  
 58  Id. at 23, 20 N.E. at 456. 
 59  See, e.g., Trabits, at 90, 323 So. 2d at 357 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 
337(2) (1959)); Carnahan, at 1097 (internal citations omitted); Closset, at 597, 230 P. at 558; 
Hurley, at 311-12; Frost, at 154; Bussell, at 445, 113 N.W. at 646-47. 
 60  See Robert H. Sitkoff, Trusts and Estates: Implementing Freedom of Disposition, 58 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 643, 662-63 (2013-14) (quoting Claflin, 149 Mass. at 23, 20 N.E. at 456). 
 61  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 337 (1959). 
 62  98 S.W.3d 307. 
 63  Id. at 309. 
 64  Id. 
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that Nathan had completed his education.65  Upon termination of the 
trust, the trust corpus was to be divided between Paulette and 
James.66  Nathan was eighteen years old when his grandmother 
died.67  Nathan enrolled in college a year later, but eventually 
dropped out and told the trustee that he did not want to continue his 
education.68  Later, Nathan changed his mind and enrolled in a 
community college in California.69  Nathan testified that at the time 
he talked to the trustee, “he was using drugs heavily and was starting 
to get into cocaine and that his life was very difficult.”70 
Meanwhile, James Hurley requested that the trustee 
terminate the trust, arguing that Nathan had completed his 
education.71  The trustee filed a petition seeking a judicial 
determination of whether the trust had terminated, or whether 
Nathan was entitled to income from the trust while he continued his 
education in California.72  The trustee responded that Mathilde, by 
authorizing support for Nathan until he reached the age of thirty-five, 
did not expect him to be enrolled continuously in college, but realized 
that he might take time off from his schooling.73  Consequently, the 
period that Nathan dropped out of college was merely a break in his 
education and not a completion of his education.74 
The trial court concluded that the trust had not terminated, 
which was affirmed on appeal.75  The appeals court observed that the 
purpose of the trust was to enable Nathan to obtain a college 
education.76  Furthermore, the court agreed with the trustee that 
Nathan was not required to attend college continuously.77  The court 
observed that the settlor had given the trustee broad discretion to 
carry out the purposes of the trust.78  Accordingly, it agreed with the 
trustee that a material purpose of the trust, namely providing support 
for Nathan’s education, was not yet achieved.79 
In particular, American courts have relied on the reasoning of 
                                                   
 65  Id. 
 66  Hurley, 98 S.W.3d at 309. 
 67  Id. 
 68  Id.  
 69  Id. 
 70  Id. at 310. 
 71  Hurley, 98 S.W.3d at 311. 
 72  Id. at 310. 
 73  Id. at 311. 
 74  Id. 
 75  Id. at 310, 312. 
 76  Hurley, 98 S.W.3d at 311. 
 77  Id. at 312. 
 78  Id. at 311. 
 79  Id. 
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the Claflin decision in refusing to terminate trusts which: (1) contain 
a spendthrift provision, (2) specify the age or other event at which the 
beneficiary is to receive his or her disbursement, (3) vest the trustee 
with discretion over such disbursements, or (4) provide support for the 
beneficiary.80 
c. Spendthrift Trusts 
A trust which contains a provision that prevents a beneficiary 
from transferring his interest in the trust is commonly known as a 
spendthrift trust.81  Although spendthrift trusts are not recognized in 
England, they are valid in most American jurisdictions.82  The 
spendthrift provision is an effective device to protect a beneficiary’s 
interest in the trust from attachment by creditors.83  Therefore, it is 
not surprising that most courts have determined that the existence of 
a spendthrift provision in a trust will prevent a trust (along with the 
protection the spendthrift provision provides) from being terminated 
while the beneficiary is still alive.84 
An interesting example of this rule is Cotham v. First National 
Bank of Hot Springs.85  The case involved a testamentary trust, which 
provided income of $300 per month to the settlor’s son, and after the 
son’s death, $100 per month to each of the settlor’s grandchildren.86  
The trust also contained a spendthrift provision.87  After the settlor’s 
death, his son and one of the grandchildren filed suit against the 
trustee, arguing that the trust violated the Rule Against 
Perpetuities.88  After the lower court upheld the validity of the trust, 
the other two grandchildren, together with the original plaintiffs, 
                                                   
 80  See Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 8, at 1328.  
 81  See Schreiber v. Kellogg, 849 F. Supp. 382, 387 (E.D. Pa. 1994) aff’d in part, rev’d in 
part, 50 F.3d 264 (3d Cir. 1995); In re Trust D Created Under Last Will & Testament of 
Darby, 290 Kan. 785, 792, 234 P.3d 793, 800 (2010). 
 82  See Richard C. Ausness, The Offshore Asset Protection Trust: A Prudent Financial 
Planning Device or the Last Refuge of a Scoundrel? 45 DUQ. L. REV. 147, 150 (2007). 
 83  See Adam J. Hirsch, Spendthrift Trusts and Public Policy: Economic and Cognitive 
Perspectives, 73 WASH. U.L.Q. 1, 2 (1995). 
 84  See Cotham at 172-173, 697 S.W.2d at 104; Sawyer at 122, 162 N.W.2d at 611; 
Merchants’ Nat’l Bank v. Crist, 140 Iowa 308, 118 N.W. 394, 395 (1908); Darby, at 793, 234 
P.3d at 800; Somers, at 767-69, 89 P.3d at 903-05; Univ. of Maine Found. v. Fleet Bank of 
Maine, 2003 Me. 20, 817 A.2d 871, 875 (2003); Mahan, at 276, 577 A.2d at 77; Rose v. So. 
Michigan Nat’l Bank, 255 Mich. 275, 282, 238 N.W. 284, 287 (1931); Heritage Bank-North, 
N.A. v. Hunterdon Medical Center, 164 N.J. Super. 33, 36, 395 A.2d 552, 554 (1978); In re 
Africa’s Estate, 359 Pa. 567, 570, 59 A.2d 925, 926 (1948); Germann v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 
286 S.C. 34, 37, 331 S.E.2d 385, 387 (S.C. Ct. App. 1985); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TRUSTS § 337, general cmt. l. 
 85  697 S.W.2d 101. 
 86  Id. at 102. 
 87  Id. at 103. 
 88  Id. at 102. 
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requested that the trust be terminated by the court.89  The trust 
beneficiaries appealed when the lower court refused to terminate the 
trust.90 
On appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court first affirmed that 
the trust did not violate the Rule Against Perpetuities.91  It then 
determined that the trust was a spendthrift trust.92  According to the 
court, by withholding the power of alienation, the settlor intended to 
restrict the trust corpus so that the beneficiaries could not obtain 
access to it except at fixed intervals and in fixed amounts.93  Finally, 
the court concluded, “[s]ince the continuance of the spendthrift trust 
is necessary to carry out the testator’s purpose, the beneficiaries 
cannot compel its termination.”94 
d. Postponed Enjoyment of the Trust Corpus 
A number of cases have involved attempts by beneficiaries to 
terminate a trust notwithstanding the fact that the trust instrument 
has postponed full enjoyment of the trust corpus.  In most cases, 
courts have refused to terminate these trusts even at the request of a 
sole beneficiary.  The court’s opinion in Speth v. Speth95 offers a 
comprehensive examination of this issue.  In Speth, the decedent 
placed her residuary estate in a testamentary trust, and directed the 
trustee to distribute the income from the trust to her brother, James 
Speth, for ten years.96  At the end of that period, James was to receive 
the entire trust corpus.97  James requested that the court terminate 
the trust prior to the expiration of the ten-year period because he was 
the sole beneficiary.98  The court considered several of the 
beneficiary’s arguments in favor of terminating the trust.99  The court 
conceded that postponing a sole beneficiary’s enjoyment of a vested 
interest for an unreasonable period of time might be contrary to 
public policy, but delaying the beneficiary’s access to the trust corpus 
for a short period of time, such as ten years, did not seem contrary to 
any public interest.100  The court observed that beneficiaries could 
freely alienate their interests if they chose to do so.101  Furthermore, a 
                                                   
 89  Id.  
 90  Cotham, 697 S.W.2d at 102.  
 91  Id. at 103. 
 92  Id. 
 93  Id. at 104. 
 94  Id. 
 95  8 N.J. Super. 587, 74 A.2d 344 (1950).  
 96  Id. at 587, 74 A.2d at 345. 
 97  Id. 
 98  Id. at 587, 74 A.2d at 346. 
 99  Id. at 593, 74 A.2d at 348. 
 100  Speth, at 594, 74 A.2d at 348. 
 101  Id. 
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settlor might have a good reason for delaying enjoyment until the 
beneficiary reached a certain age.  According to the court: 
It is equally difficult to perceive the considerations of policy 
which are said to prevent a testator from exercising  his judgment and 
discretion by reasonably deferring the unqualified enjoyment of the 
principal of his devise or bequest without explaining to the beneficiary 
and to the public his reasons for doing so.102 
The court added that some seemingly arbitrary or 
unreasonable restrictions on the enjoyment of the trust corpus might, 
in fact, “rest upon wise and perspicacious reasons known to the 
testator and unknown to the general public and to the court.”103 
The court then addressed the beneficiary’s claim that the trust 
was passive because the trustee had no duty to hold or manage the 
trust assets.104  In the latter instance, the trust would be executed by 
the Statute of Uses, and legal title to the trust corpus would be 
transferred to the beneficiary free of trust.  However, in this case, the 
court pointed out that the settlor had directed the trustees “to invest 
and reinvest the rest, residue and remainder of my estate both real, 
personal and of every kind and description and wheresoever situated, 
and to collect and receive the income thereon” for a period of ten 
years.105  In the court’s view, charging the trustees with these 
responsibilities ensured that the trust was active.106 
Maley v. Citizens National Bank of Evansville107 involved an 
attempt by several beneficiaries to terminate a trust, which postponed 
full enjoyment of the trust corpus until they reached the age of thirty-
one.108  The trust was created in 1927 by Henry Maley from his share 
of a testamentary trust established by his mother, Eva, at her death 
in 1923.109  It was later supplemented by additional funds that Henry 
received from his mother’s trust when he reached the age of thirty-
one.110  The trust corpus consisted of Liberty Loan bonds issued by the 
United States Government.111  The trust provided that Henry’s wife, 
Virginia, would receive the income from the trust during her 
lifetime.112  In addition, the trust provided that after Virginia’s death, 
                                                   
102  Id. 
103  Id. at 595, 74 A.2d at 348. 
104  Id. at 595, 74 A.2d at 349. 
 105  Speth, at 589, 74 A.2d at 345. 
 106  Id. at 596, 74 A.2d at 349. 
 107  120 Ind. App. 642, 92 N.E.2d 727 (1950). 
 108  Id. at 650, 92 N.E.2d at 731. 
 109  Id. at 646, 92 N.E.2d at 729. 
 110  Id. at 649, 92 N.E.2d at 730. 
 111  Id. at 646, 92 N.E.2d at 729. 
 112  Maley, 120 Ind. App. at 647, 92 N.E.2d at 729. 
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the trust corpus would be distributed to Henry and Virginia’s children 
when the youngest child reached the age of twenty-six.113  Henry and 
Virginia were divorced in 1932, and Henry died in 1935, survived by 
his ex-wife and two children, Henry and Virginia.114 
Some years later, Virginia and the children brought suit to 
terminate the trust, although they had not yet reached the age of 
twenty-six.115  The trustee objected, and the trial court refused to 
grant the requested relief.116  Relying on the Claflin decision, the 
Indiana Appeals Court rejected the contention that the beneficiaries, 
as sui juris, were entitled to demand termination of the trust even 
though they had not reached the required age for distribution of the 
corpus.117  The court declared that Indiana courts had refused to 
terminate trusts except in cases “where the interference of the court 
did not disturb or destroy the trust scheme, but was rendered 
necessary in order to prevent its entire failure.”118 
The plaintiffs also claimed that the trust purpose had become 
impossible to carry out because the trustee could not obtain an 
adequate income from investing in government bonds.119  However, 
the court responded that the trustee was not restricted to investing in 
such low-interest securities, but was free to shift some of the trust’s 
assets to higher-yielding investments.120  For these reasons, the 
appeals court upheld the lower court’s refusal to terminate the 
trust.121 
In Lafferty v. Sheets,122 J.W. and Medora Sheets executed a 
joint will which provided that their son, Joseph, would receive the 
income from their residuary estate during the lifetime of Joseph’s 
wife, Lala.123  If Joseph survived her, he would receive the entire trust 
corpus at Lala’s death.124  It was not clear why Joseph’s parents put 
this strange provision in their will.  In any event, Joseph’s father died 
                                                   
 113  Id. at 652-653, 92 N.E.2d at 732. 
 114  Id. at 645, 92 N.E.2d at 729. 
 115  Id. at 650, 92 N.E.2d at 731. 
 116  Id. at 644, 92 N.E.2d at 728.  In the alternative, the plaintiffs requested the court to 
modify the trust to enable the trustee to make higher-yielding investments; that request 
was also denied.  Maley, 120 Ind. App. At 644, 92 N.E.2d at 728. 
 117  Id. at 654, 92 N.E.2d at 732. 
 118  Id. at 654, 92 N.E.2d at 733 (quoting Wilson, Trustee, v. Edmonds, 78 Ind. App. 501, 
136 N.E. 48, 49 (1922)). 
 119  Id. at 655, 92 N.E.2d at 733. 
 120  Id.  
 121  Maley, 120 Ind. App. at 656, 92 N.E.2d at 734. 
 122  175 Kan. 741, 267 P.2d 962 (1954). 
 123  Id. at 742, 267 P.2d at 964. 
 124  Id. 
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in September 1950, and his mother died a few months later.125  
During probate of his mother’s estate, Joseph, along with Lala and his 
two children, sought to have his mother’s residuary estate distributed 
directly to Joseph.126  The trial court agreed to distribute the estate to 
Joseph, and the executor appealed.127 
On appeal, the Kansas Supreme Court determined that the 
trust established by the parents’ will was not passive in nature since 
the trustee was to actively manage the trust property.128  The court 
also declared that it would follow the Claflin Doctrine.129  It also 
quoted section 337 and comment j of the Second Restatement of 
Trusts, which expressly stated that a court would not ordinarily 
terminate a trust prematurely when it provided that the sole 
beneficiary of the trust was not to receive the trust corpus until some 
later time.130  The court concluded that Joseph’s parents had made it 
clear that “the trust created by them was to continue until the death 
of the son’s wife [and] that such provision was material to the manner 
in which they disposed of their property.”131  Therefore, it reversed the 
decision of the trial court.132 
e. Discretionary Trusts 
“A discretionary trust is established when the grantor gives 
the trustee discretion to make distributions from the trust, and the 
beneficiary has no legal authority to force the trustee to make a 
distribution . . . from either the income or principal.”133  In such cases, 
the trust beneficiaries cannot compel the trustee to terminate the 
trust prematurely.134  A New Jersey court followed this rule recently 
in the case of In re Estate of Bonardi.135  In that case, the testator’s 
will created two trusts: the first trust designated the testator’s wife, 
Donna, as the income beneficiary, with a gift over to his daughters, 
                                                   
 125  Id. at 743, 267 P.2d at 964. 
 126  Id. at 743-44, 267 P.2d at 964-65. 
 127  Lafferty, 175 Kan. at 744, 267 P.2d at 965. 
 128  Id. at 747, 267 P.2d at 967. 
 129  Id. at 748, 267 P.2d at 967. 
 130  Id. at 750, 267 P.2d at 969. 
 131  Id. at 751, 267 P.2d at 969. 
 132  Lafferty, 175 Kan. at 751, 267 P.2d at 969. 
 133  Hemphill v. Shore, 295 Kan. 1110, 1118, 289 P.3d 1173, 1180 (2012). See Solis v. 
Koresko, 884 F. Supp. 2d 261, 289 (E.D. Pa. 2012); Tannen v. Tannen, 416 N.J. Super. 248, 
265, 3 A.3d 1229, 1239 (2010). 
 134  See, e.g., Clemenson v. Rebsamen, 168 S.W.2d 195, 196-97 (Ark. 1943); In re Roberts’ 
Estate, 35 N.W.2d 756, 757-58 (Iowa 1949); Hemphill, at 1118, 289 P.3d at 1180; Tannen, 
416 N.J. Super. at 265, 3 A.3d at 1239 (2010); In re Estate of Bonardi, 376 N.J. Super. 508, 
871 A.2d 103 (2005); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 337, general cmt. n. 
 135  376 N.J. Super. 508, 871 A.2d 103. 
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Danielle and Jessica.136  The testator also authorized the trustee, a 
friend of the family, to distribute to Donna “such amounts of the 
principal of the Trust as the Trustee, in the exercise of the Trustee’s 
absolute discretion, deems advisable for her welfare.”137  The second 
trust provided for the distribution of the corpus to Danielle and 
Jessica when they reached the age of twenty-five.138 
Shortly after the testator’s death, Donna obtained a release of 
the daughters’ remainder interest in the first trust and petitioned the 
chancery court to terminate it.139  The lower court agreed to the 
termination and the trustee appealed.140  The appeals court 
reversed.141  The court observed that the testator declared in his will 
that the trustee should not invade the trust corpus in order to provide 
primary support for Donna since she was capable of supporting 
herself.142  Instead, he directed the trustee to “preserve the corpus, to 
the extent possible, for ultimate distribution to my children.”143  In 
addition, the court noted that the trustee had testified that Donna 
was qualified to work full-time as a nurse.144  Furthermore, the 
trustee claimed that the testator was concerned about his wife’s 
excessive use of alcohol, and expressed concern “that if the estate’s 
assets were left to Donna outright, she would continue to lead this 
lifestyle which he felt was inappropriate, unhealthy and against his 
wishes.”145 
These trust provisions suggested that the testator’s intent was 
to provide supplementary income to Donna, but vested considerable 
discretion in the trustee to manage the trust’s assets prudently and to 
only invade the corpus for Donna’s benefit in the case of an 
emergency, with the expectation that Danielle and Jessica would 
receive most or all of the trust corpus at his wife’s death.146  Allowing 
Donna to receive the entire trust corpus would ignore the testator’s 
concern about her ability to manage the property responsibly, and 
would also frustrate his objective of providing for his daughters or 
their descendants after his wife’s death.147  Finally, since the 
daughters’ remainder interest in the trust would not vest until they 
                                                   
 136  Id. at 511, 871 A.2d at 104. 
 137  Id. at 511, 871 A.2d at 105. 
 138  Id. at 511, 871 A.2d at 104-105. 
 139  Id. at 514, 871 A.2d at 106. 
 140  Bonardi, 376 N.J. Super. at 514, 871 A.2d at 106-107. 
 141  Id.  
 142  Id. at 517, 871 A.2d at 108. 
 143  Id. 
 144  Id. at 512, 871 A.2d at 105. 
 145  Bonardi, 376 N.J. Super. 512, 871 A.2d at 105. 
 146  Id. at 517-518, 871 A.2d at 108-109. 
 147  Id. at 518, 871 A.2d at 109. 
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reached the age of twenty-five, the release of their remainder was 
invalid since they had not yet reached twenty-five at the time they 
purported to do so.148  Consequently, the court reversed the lower 
court’s decision to terminate the trust.149 
f. Support Trusts 
A number of courts have also refused to terminate support 
trusts prematurely.150  A pure support trust is one where the terms of 
the trust direct the trustee to pay to the beneficiary or to apply for his 
use so much of the income or principal as he believes is necessary for 
his support.151  In contrast, a discretionary support trust is one in 
which the trustee is authorized to pay the beneficiary whatever 
amount of trust income or principal that he believes is necessary for 
the beneficiary’s support. 152  When the settlor’s intent is to provide 
the beneficiary with maintenance and support for life, or for some 
fixed period, premature termination of a support trust would seem to 
be inconsistent with a material purpose of the trust.  However, 
because most support trusts also contain spendthrift clauses, courts 
tend to rely on the spendthrift clauses instead of support provisions in 
order to justify a refusal to terminate a support trust. 
However, the case of Gershaw v. Gershfield153 is an interesting 
exception.  The Gershaw case involved a trust established by Samuel 
Gershfield.154  The trust instrument initially provided that its assets 
would be divided at Samuel’s death between his daughter, Cynthia, 
and his son, Burton.155  Cynthia was to receive her share free of trust, 
but Burton’s share was to remain subject to the trust for his 
                                                   
 148  Id. at 518, 871 A.2d at 109. 
 149  Id. at 520, 871 A.2d at 110. 
 150  See, e.g., Gershaw v. Gershfield, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 81, 90, 751 N.E.2d 424, 432 (2001); 
West v. Third Nat’l Bank of Hampton Cnty., 11 Mass. App. Ct. 577, 580-81, 417 N.E.2d 991, 
993 (1981); In re Henderson’s Estate, 258 Pa. 510, 515, 102 A. 217, 218 (1917); Townsend v. 
Rainier Nat’l Bank, 51 Wash. App 19, 22, 751 P.2d 1214, 1216 (1988); see also 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 337, general cmt. m. 
 151  See In re McLoughlin, 507 F.2d 177, 185 (5th Cir. 1975); Schreiber v. Kellogg, 849 
F.Supp. 382, 391 (E.D. Pa. 1994) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 50 F.3d 264 (3d Cir. 1995); In re 
Estate of Gist, 763 N.W.2d 561, 565 (Iowa 2009); Emmet Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors v. Ridout, 
692 N.W.2d 821, 826 (Iowa 2005); Darby, 290 Kan. at 791, 234 P.3d at 799; In re Estate of 
Brown, 148 Vt. 94, 96, 528 A.2d 752, 754 (1987); see also George Gleason Bogert et al., THE 
LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 229, 583-84 (3d ed. 2007). 
 152  See In re Barkema Trust, 690 N.W.2d 50, 54 (Iowa 2004); Smith v. Smith, 246 Neb. 193, 
197, 517 N.W.2d 394, 398 (1994); Bohac v. Graham, 424 N.W.2d 144, 146 (N.D. 1988); 
Lineback v. Stout, 79 N.C. App. 292, 296, 339 S.E.2d 103, 106 (1976).  See also Lawrence A. 
Frolik, Discretionary Trusts for a Disabled Beneficiary: A Solution or a Trap for the 
Unwary? 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 335, 342 (1984-85).  
 153  52 Mass. App. Ct. 81, 751 N.E.2d 424.   
 154  Id. at 82, 751 N.E.2d at 427. 
 155  Id. at 82-83, 751 N.E.2d at 427. 
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lifetime.156  The trust was later amended to provide that Burton’s 
children, Ace and Julie, might also receive distributions for their 
education and support from Burton’s share of the trust until they 
reached the age of twenty-five.157 
The trust instrument declared that “the Trustees shall pay or 
apply so much of the principal and income as the Trustees in their 
sole discretion deem advisable to provide for BURTON C. 
GERSHFIELD’S proper care, maintenance, medical needs, health, 
support, education and emergency needs and that of his issue under 
the age of twenty-five.”158  Burton’s share was also subject to a 
spendthrift provision.159  Samuel treated his children differently 
because Burton’s life was characterized by mental instability, 
dysfunctional relationships, and drug abuse.160  Consequently, 
Samuel felt that he should keep Burton’s share in trust in order to 
provide him with lifetime support and housing.161 
After Samuel’s death, Scott Gershaw, the trustee, sought 
instructions with respect to the priority of distributions among the 
three beneficiaries of Burton’s trust.162  However, at trial, the trustee 
asked the court’s permission to terminate the trust and divide its 
assets equally among Burton, Ace, and Julie.163  After ordering the 
distribution of some of the trust property for the payment of certain 
claims and expenses, the court ruled that the one-third of the 
remaining assets should be set aside for Burton’s housing needs, and 
the rest divided equally between Burton’s children to pay for their 
college education.164 
The appeals court vacated the trial court’s judgment and 
concluded that the primary purpose of the trust was to provide for 
Burton’s “lifetime support and housing needs,” and this should take 
priority over any distributions to Burton’s children.165  The court also 
held that termination was improper because the trust, by its own 
terms, was to continue for Burton’s lifetime.166  The court concluded 
by declaring “[t]he trustees had a duty to fulfill the donor’s clearly 
expressed intention that Burton receive lifetime support and housing, 
                                                   
 156  Id. at 83, 751 N.E.2d at 427. 
 157  Id.  
 158  Gershaw, 52 Mass. App. Ct. at 88, 751 N.E.2d at 431. 
 159  Id. at 86, 751 N.E.2d at 430. 
 160  Id. at 90, 751 N.E.2d at 432, n.14. 
 161  Id. 
 162  Id. at 84, 751 N.E.2d at 428. 
 163  Gershaw, 52 Mass. App. Ct. at 84, 751 N.E.2d at 428. 
 164  Id. at 84-85, 751 N.E.2d at 428-29 
 165  Id. at 87, 751 N.E.2d at 430. 
 166  Id.,at 89-90, 751 N.E.2d at 432. 
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if needed, and could not terminate the trust until its purposes had 
been fulfilled.”167 
3. Partial Termination 
Sometimes a court will allow a partial termination of a trust, 
particularly when the trust corpus is capable of producing far more 
income than is necessary to pay the income beneficiaries.  For 
example, In the Matter of the Trust Established Under Trust 
Agreement of Thomas A. Boright, deceased168 involved a trust with a 
corpus of $900,000 and a single beneficiary who was entitled to 
receive $12,000 a year for life.169  At the request of the remaindermen, 
the Minnesota Supreme Court authorized the trustee to set aside 
enough of the trust corpus to make the required payments to the life 
beneficiary, or to purchase an annuity to fund these payments.170  The 
court also authorized the trustee to distribute the remaining trust 
corpus to the remaindermen.171 
Another court also allowed partial termination in University of 
Maine Foundation v. Fleet Bank of Maine.172  The trust, known as the 
Gilbert Trust, was established by the will of Charles Gilbert, who died 
in 1953.173  The trust provided for the payment of specific amounts of 
money annually to various family members and nonprofit 
organizations.174  In addition, the trust provided for termination at 
the death of the last life beneficiary, and transfer of the trust corpus 
to the University of Maine Foundation and made part of the Charles 
E. Gilbert Fund.175  The Fund, which provided loans to students in 
medicine, dentistry, and veterinary medicine, was established by 
Gilbert in his will when he exercised a power of appointment created 
by his wife.176 
Over the years, the trust corpus grew from $3.13 million in 
1990, to $9.34 million in 2000.177  This led the Foundation to offer the 
three remaining life beneficiaries $25,000 annually to agree to 
terminate the trust instead of the $5,000 that they were then 
receiving.178  When the trustee refused to terminate the trust 
                                                   
 167  Id. at 90, 751 N.E.2d at 432. 
 168  377 N.W.2d 9 (Minn. 1985). 
 169  Id. at 13. 
 170  Id.  
 171  Id. at 14. 
 172  817 A.2d 871. 
 173  Id. at 873. 
 174  Id. 
 175  Id. 
 176  Id. 
 177  Univ. of Maine, 817 A.2d at 874.  
 178  Id.  
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voluntarily, the Foundation sought judicial termination of the trust.179  
The lower court agreed, and ordered distribution of most of the trust 
corpus to the Foundation.180 
On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine observed that 
the life beneficiaries’ interests were subject to a spendthrift clause.181  
Therefore, the court concluded that it would be improper to terminate 
the trust since a material purpose of the trust – the protection of the 
beneficiaries from the claims of creditors – could not be achieved if the 
trust was prematurely terminated.182  However, the court went on to 
consider whether partial termination was a viable option.183  Noting 
that other courts allow partial termination of a trust in similar 
circumstances,184 the Maine court declared that partial termination 
“carried out the respective settlor’s intent, while at the same time 
released idle funds to the remainderman that the settlor ultimately 
intended to benefit.”185  Applying this reasoning to the instant case, 
the court concluded that “[n]o good reason exists for the foundation to 
wait for the life-beneficiaries’ interests to end before receiving surplus 
trust assets,” as long as the court withheld a sufficient amount from 
the Foundation’s distribution to enable the trustee to protect the life 
beneficiaries’ interests.186 
4. Family Settlement Agreements 
Family settlement agreements are another means of 
terminating a trust.187  A family settlement agreement is a plan 
formulated by interested parties to modify or terminate a trust and 
distribute the decedent’s property with court approval in a different 
manner than that provided for under a will or trust.188  Courts usually 
encourage such settlements because they are thought to prevent 
hostility and discord among family members.189  When the 
beneficiaries of a trust petition the court to terminate the trust 
                                                   
 179  Id. 
 180  Id.  
 181  Id. at 873  
 182  Univ. of Maine, 817 A.2d at 875. 
 183  Id.  
 184  Id. at 875-76 (citing Ames v. Hall, 313 Mass. 33, 46 N.E.2d 403, 404 (1943); Boright, 
377 N.W.2d 9 (Minn. 1985)). 
 185  Univ. of Maine, 817 A.2d at 876. 
 186  Id. 
 187  See generally, Gerry W. Beyer, Annual Rev. of Texas Law: Wills and Trusts, 59 SMU L. 
REV. 1603, 1614-1615 (2006). 
 188  In re Estate of Neiswender, 616 N.W.2d 83, 86 (S.D. 2000). 
 189  See, e.g., Harris v. Harris, 236 Ark. 676, 685, 370 S.W.2d 121, 127 (1963); In re Will of 
Pendergrass, 251 N.C. 737, 744, 112 S.E.2d 562, 567 (1960); In re Estate of Way, 379 Pa. 
421, 437, 109 A.2d 164, 172 (1954).  Although these arrangements are usually referred to as 
family settlements, they are not limited to family members. 
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prematurely, they must show that they are competent to execute the 
agreement, and that all members of the beneficiary class are 
included.190  The beneficiaries must also demonstrate that the 
agreement is reasonable and fair to all parties.191  In addition, the 
court must conclude that the agreement is designed to resolve a bona 
fide controversy involving the will or trust.192  Finally, under the 
traditional rule, the beneficiaries must also prove that the trust 
purposes have been achieved.193 
Although courts have long approved family settlements on the 
basis of their inherent powers,194 many states have now enacted 
statutes that expressly authorize court approval of settlement 
agreements.195  In addition, both the Uniform Probate Code196 and the 
Uniform Trust Code197 recognize family settlement agreements.  Both 
of these uniform acts provide for nonjudicial family settlements.198  It 
is interesting to note that neither act specifically requires that the 
proposed settlement arise from a dispute or controversy among the 
beneficiaries.199 
B. Modification of Irrevocable Trusts 
The Claflin doctrine has commonly been applied to 
modification, as well as termination, of trusts.200  Consequently, a 
number of courts have refused to modify the terms of a trust, 
                                                   
 190  See Bogert et al., supra note 151, at § 1009, 458-61. 
 191  See Merkel v. Long, 368 Mich. 1, 14-15, 117 N.W.2d 130, 136-37 (1962); Metzner v. 
Newman, 224 Mich. 324, 336, 194 N.W. 1008, 1012 (1923); Burtman v. Burtman, 94 N.H. 
412, 416, 54 A.2d 367, 370 (1947). 
 192  See Breault v. Feigenholtz, 358 F.2d 39, 44 (7th Cir. 1966); In re Estate of Ward, 200 
Ariz. 113, 117-18, 23 P.3d 108, 112-13 (App. Div. 1 2001); Altemeier v. Harris, 403 Ill. 345, 
350, 86 N.E.2d 229, 233 (1949) (quoting Wolf v. Uhlemann, 325 Ill. 165, 156 N.E. 334, 340 
(1927)); Stein v. La Salle Nat’l Bank, 328 Ill. App. 3, 7, 65 N.E.2d 216, 218 (1946); O’Neil v. 
O’Neil, 271 N.C. 106, 112-13, 155 S.E.2d 495, 500-01 (1967). 
 193  See Adams v. Link, 145 Conn. 634, 638, 145 A.2d 753, 755 (1958); West v. Downer, 218 
Ga. 235, 243, 127 S.E.2d 359, 364-65 (1962); Stephens v. Collison, 274 Ill. 389, 396, 113 N.E. 
691, 694 (1916); In re Matter of Ransom, 180 N.J. Super. 108, 120, 433 A.2d 834, 840 (Ch. 
Div. 1981) (internal citation omitted); Appeal of Gannon, 428 Pa. Super. 349, 367-68, 631 
A.2d 176, 185 (1993) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 337, cmt. a). 
 194  See Bogert et al., supra note 151, at § 1009, 450-51. 
 195  See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 13.26.344 (West 2014); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-5-25 (West 2014); 
IND. CODE §§ 29-1-0-1 to 29-1-9-3 (2014); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 633.114 & 633.115 (West 
2014); MO. ANN STAT. § 473.084 (West 2014); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1502G (McKinney 
2014); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 175.24 (West 2014); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3323 (West 
2014); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 44-5-7 (West 2014); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 879.59 (West 2013). 
 196  UNIF. PROB. CODE §§ 3-912, 3-1101, & 3-1102 (2010). 
 197  UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 111, 411 (2013). 
 198  UNIF. PROB. CODE § 3-912 (2010); UNIF. TRUST CODE § 111 (2013). 
 199  Id. 
 200  See Conditional Love, supra note 6, at 468; Joshua C. Tate, Perpetual Trusts and the 
Settlor’s Intent, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 595, 607 (2005) [hereinafter Perpetual Trusts]. 
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concluding that modification would be contrary to a material purpose 
of the settlor or that a material purpose of the trust had not been 
attained.201  On the other hand, under the equitable deviation 
doctrine, “if circumstances unanticipated by the settlor occur, the 
court may modify the administrative terms of the trust, but only to 
prevent the unanticipated circumstances from defeating or 
substantially impairing the accomplishment of the purposes of the 
trust.”202  This doctrine has been endorsed by many courts as a means 
of enabling them to modify the administrative provisions of a trust in 
response to unforeseen circumstances.203 
1. Equitable Deviation 
Courts have sometimes relied on the equitable deviation 
doctrine to override restrictions on the sale of trust property.204  One 
of the leading cases on this doctrine is In re Estate of Pulitzer.205  
Newspaper publisher, Joseph Pulitzer, died in 1911.206  In his will, he 
left shares of the Press Publishing Co. and Pulitzer Publishing in 
trust for the benefit of his children and certain other persons.207  The 
former company published the New York World, the Sunday World, 
and the Evening World, while the latter company published the St. 
Louis Post Dispatch.208  In his will, Pulitzer expressly prohibited the 
trustees from selling any of the trust’s Press Publishing Co. stock.209  
Nevertheless, in 1931, the trustees, with the consent of the trust 
beneficiaries, sought court approval to sell the stock.210  The court 
                                                   
 201  See, e.g., Smith v. Hallum, 286 Ga. 834, 836, 691 S.E.2d 848, 850 (2010); Thomson v. 
Union Nat’l Bank in Kansas City, 291 S.W.2d 178, 182-83 (Mo. 1956). 
 202  Alan Newman, The Intention of the Settlor Under the Uniform Trust Code: Whose 
Property Is It, Anyway? 38 AKRON L. REV. 661, 663 (2005). See also Chapman, at 953, 
N.E.2d at 580. 
 203  See Thurlow v. Berry, 249 Ala. 597, 605, 32 So.2d 526, 533 (1947) (internal citations 
omitted); Adams v. Cook, 15 Cal. 2d 352, 359, 101 P.2d 484, 488 (1940); Young v. Young, 255 
Mich. 173, 179-80, 237 N.W. 535, 537 (1931); In re JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 19 Misc.3d 
337, 340, 852 N.Y.S.2d 718, 721 (Sur. Ct. 2008); In re Aberlin, 264 A.D.2d 775, 695 N.Y.S.2d 
383 (1999); Carnahan, at 1097 (internal citations omitted); Nieman v. Vaughn Cmty. 
Church, 154 Wash. 2d 365, 378, 113 P.3d 463, 470-71 (2005) (distinguishing, in the case of a 
charitable trust, between equitable deviation and cy pres); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TRUSTS § 167. 
 204  See Hewitt v. Beattie, 106 Conn. 602, 138 A. 795, 802-03 (1927); Stout v. Stout, 192 Ky. 
504, 233 S.W. 1057, 1059-60 (1921); Young, at 179-80, 237 N.W. at 537; In re Estate of 
Pulitzer, 139 Misc. 575, 249 N.Y.S. 87 (Sur. Ct. 1931); Carnahan v. Johnson, 711 N.E. 1093, 
1097 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (internal citations omitted); Weld v. Weld, 23 R.I. 311, 50 A. 490 
(1901); Colin McK. Grant Home v. Medlock, 292 S.C. 466, 474, 349 S.E.2d 655, 660 (S.C. Ct. 
App. 1986); Nieman, at 377, 113 P.3d at 468. 
 205  139 Misc. 575, 249 N.Y.S. 87. 
 206  Id. at 577, 249 N.Y.S. at 91. 
 207  Id. 
 208  Id. at 578, 249 N.Y.S. at 92. 
 209  Id. 
 210  Pulitzer, at 576, 249 N.Y.S. at 90. 
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found that the newspapers owned by Press Publishing had been losing 
money for several years,211 and it was likely that the stock would 
eventually lose much of its value, thereby diminishing the interests of 
the trust beneficiaries.212 
The New York Surrogate Court began by observing that 
“[c]ourts of equity in other jurisdictions have found power to relieve 
against the provisions of the instrument by granting the authority to 
dispose of perishable property or wasting assets, despite the express 
command or wishes contained in the will.”213  The court then declared 
that the “extreme circumstances” in the Pulitzer case justified 
disregarding the direction of the testator and authorizing the trustees 
to sell the Press Publishing Co. stock.214 
As Professor Gallanis points out, the court purported to give 
effect to the settlor’s implicit, but unexpressed intention by finding 
that Pulitzer’s dominant purpose was to provide for a generous 
income for his children and the eventual distribution of the intact 
trust corpus to his grandchildren.215  According to the court, “[a] man 
of his sagacity and business ability could not have intended that from 
mere vanity, the publication of the newspapers, with which his name 
and efforts had been associated, should be persisted in until the entire 
trust asset was destroyed or wrecked by bankruptcy or dissolution.”216  
Notwithstanding the court’s flattering assessment of the testator’s 
business acumen, Gallanis concluded that Pulitzer was sufficiently 
vain that he probably never thought that his newspapers would 
become unprofitable.217  Thus, the court’s reliance on imputed intent 
in the Pulitzer case was suspect to say the least.218 
In addition to authorizing the sale of trust property, courts 
have applied the principle of equitable deviation to such 
administrative matters as removing a trustee, modifying a trust 
investment portfolio, or extending the duration of the trust.  Donnelly 
v. National Bank of Washington219 provides an interesting example of 
a court’s use of equitable deviation to extend the duration of a trust.  
Before his death in 1940, the settlor executed a testamentary trust 
providing for his grandson, Willis Donnelly, to receive money for his 
support “so long as [he] is a student in good standing at some 
                                                   
 211  Id. at 582, 249 N.Y.S. at 97. 
 212  Id.  
 213  Id. at 581, 249 N.Y.S. at 95. 
 214  Id. at 582, 249 N.Y.S. at 96-97. 
 215  See Gallanis, supra note 51, at 225. 
 216  Pulitzer, at 580, 249 N.Y.S. at 95. 
 217  See Gallanis, supra note 51, at 225. 
 218  Id. 
 219  27 Wash.2d 622, 179 P.2d 333 (1947). 
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recognized, degree granting college, University, or post-graduate 
school, but in no event beyond December 31, 1945.”220  Willis 
graduated from the University of Washington in August 1942, and 
had completed one year of law school when he was drafted into the 
Marine Corps.221  He was discharged in April 1946, and resumed his 
law school studies.222  However, the trustee refused to renew his 
stipend, declaring that it was not authorized to provide support for 
Willis after 1945.223 
Willis sued the trustee, and the trial court ordered the trustee 
to make payments to Willis for another three years to allow him to 
obtain his law degree.224  Relying on the Restatement of Trusts225 and 
other sources,226 the appeals court affirmed the trial court’s 
decision.227  The court declared that it should do what it believes the 
settlor would have done if he could have foreseen what happened.228  
According to the court, the settlor had intended to provide enough 
financial support to enable his grandson to complete his studies.229  If 
World War II had not broken out, the time limit specified in the will 
would have provided ample time for Willis to obtain his law degree.230  
Obviously, the settlor did not foresee that his grandson would be 
called away from his studies for more than three years to serve in the 
military during the war.231  According to the court, “[i]t is unthinkable 
that a settlor who regarded his grandson as a son would have so 
restricted the time on the education payments as to prevent the boy, 
because he was summoned from his school to the armed forces of our 
country, from completing his education.”232  Therefore, the appeals 
court upheld the lower court’s modification of the trust provisions.233 
The traditional doctrine of equitable deviation only allowed 
modification of the administrative provisions of a trust, and was not 
applicable to distributive provisions.234  However, a few courts have 
                                                   
 220  Id. at 623, 179 P.2d at 333. 
 221  Id.  
 222  Id. at 624, 179 P.2d at 333. 
 223  Id. 
 224  Donnelly, at 624, 179 P.2d at 334. 
 225  RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 167 (1935). 
 226  2 SCOTT ON TRUSTS § 167 at 1268-82; Cook, at 362-63, 101 P.2d at 489; Young, at 173, 
237 N.W. at 535; Bennett v. Nashville Trust Co., 127 Tenn. 126, 153 S.W. 840 (1913). 
 227  Donnelly, at 629, 179 P.2d at 336. 
 228  Id. at 627, 179 P.2d at 335. 
 229  Id. at 627-28, 179 P.2d at 335-36. 
 230  Id. at 628, 179 P.2d at 336. 
 231  Id. 
 232  Id. 
 233  Id. 
 234  See Estate of Van Deusen, 30 Cal. 2d. 285, 288, 182 P.2d 565, 569 (1947); Staley v. 
Ligon, 239 Md. 61, 69, 210 A.2d 384, 388-89 (1965). 
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expanded the equitable deviation doctrine to permit the modification 
of a trust’s distributive provisions.235  For example, this approach was 
followed by an Alabama court in Trabits v. First National Bank of 
Mobile.236  In 1943, the settlor created an inter vivos trust under 
which his daughter was to receive $100 per month during her 
lifetime.237  After the death of the Settlor’s daughter, the trust corpus 
was to be distributed to her children and grandchildren, if any 
existed.238  The trust instrument further provided that the trust 
corpus would be distributed to the daughter’s estate if she died 
without having any children.239 
The settlor reserved the power to raise the monthly payments, 
which he did on several occasions prior to his death in 1968.240  At the 
time of his death, the daughter was receiving $400 per month from 
the trust.241  Several years later, the daughter petitioned to either: (1) 
terminate the trust; (2) order the trustee to distribute all of the trust 
income to her; or (3) increase the monthly payments by an amount 
which, in the court’s opinion, the settlor would have done if he were 
still alive.242  The daughter alleged that the trust corpus exceeded 
$150,000 and that the trust income was $7,000 per year more than 
was paid out to her as a life beneficiary.243  She further contended 
that: 
[T]he present accumulation of corpus and the amount of 
annual excess trust income added to the corpus are circumstances 
that were not foreseen by the settlor and that, in order to effectuate 
the original trust purpose, it has become necessary and proper either 
to increase the size of the monthly payment to the beneficiary or to 
terminate the trust.244 
Finally, the daughter argued that because she was presently 
childless and had undergone a hysterectomy, there would be no 
children or grandchildren to take the trust corpus at her death.245 
The lower court granted the trustee’s motion to dismiss and 
the daughter appealed.246  The trustee maintained that the lower 
                                                   
 235  See Wolcott, at 23, 56 A.2d at 641. 
 236  295 Ala. 85, 323 So.2d 353. 
 237  Id. at 88, 323 So.2d at 355. 
 238  Id. at 86, 323 So.2d at 355. 
 239  Id. 
 240  Id. at 88, 323 So.2d at 355. 
 241  Trabits, at 88, 323 So.2d at 355. 
 242  Id. at 86-88, 323 So.2d at 355. 
 243  Id. at 88, 323 So.2d at 355. 
 244  Id. at 88, 323 So.2d at 355-56. 
 245  Id. at 88, 323 So.2d at 356. 
 246  Trabits, at 86, 323 So.2d 355. 
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court could not grant relief unless the trust instrument was 
ambiguous, which it was not.247  However, the Alabama Supreme 
Court held that the terms of a trust could be modified under the 
doctrine of equitable deviation, even if the terms were not 
ambiguous.248  Moreover, the court declared that if the trust purposes 
are not clearly expressed in the trust instrument, a court could 
identify its purposes with the aid of extrinsic evidence.249  The court 
reversed the lower court’s decision and remanded the case for a 
trial.250  Furthermore, the court indicated that equitable deviation 
allowed the lower court to increase payments to the daughter if it 
concluded that this disbursement of trust funds was consistent with 
the trust purposes. 
Prior to the promulgation of the Uniform Trust Code, a few 
states enacted statutory versions of the equitable deviation doctrine, 
enabling courts to modify the distributive terms of a trust.  
Hamerstrom v. Commerce Bank of Kansas City, N.A., illustrates some 
of the issues that arose in connection with these statutes.251  In this 
case, the settlor, who died in 1966, created a testamentary trust and 
directed his trustee to pay Elizabeth Hamerstrom $150 per month for 
life.252  At her death, the trust corpus was to be distributed to 
Elizabeth’s husband, Davis, and if Davis predeceased Elizabeth, the 
settlor directed the trustees to distribute the trust corpus to Eric and 
Edward Hamerstrom.253  In 1989, Elizabeth petitioned the lower court 
to increase the payment to her to $2,000 per month.254  Davis, Eric, 
and Edward consented to the proposed modification.255 
Elizabeth alleged that inflation, her husband’s retirement, and 
increased health care costs had resulted in an unforeseen change in 
her economic condition.256  She also claimed that the trust corpus of 
$425,000 currently generated income of $26,000 per year; therefore, 
the trustee could increase her payments without having to invade the 
trust corpus.257  The trial court appointed a guardian ad litem to 
represent the interests of any unknown or unascertained 
remaindermen.258  The guardian ad litem objected because the 
                                                   
 247  Id. at 89, 323 So.2d at 357. 
 248  Id.  
 249  Id. 
 250  Id. at 91, 323 So.2d at 358. 
 251  808 S.W.2d 434 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991). 
 252  Id. at 435. 
 253  Id. 
 254  Id. 
 255  Id. 
 256  Hamerstrom, 808 S.W.2d at 435. 
 257  Id. 
 258  Id. 
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proposed deviation would not benefit the remaindermen.259  The trial 
court agreed, and refused to approve the proposed modification.260 
The Hamerstrom case arose in Missouri, which enacted an 
equitable deviation statute in 1983.261  The statute provided that a 
court may vary the terms of a trust “only upon finding that such 
variation will benefit the disabled, minor, unborn and unascertained 
beneficiaries . . . .”262  The issue was whether the term “beneficiaries” 
in the statute included unnamed and unascertained potential 
survivors of Eric and Edward, or whether the term was limited to 
beneficiaries who were expressly mentioned in the trust.263  The court 
observed that there was a split of authority on this issue.264  States 
that had adopted the Uniform Probate Code defined beneficiary to 
include “a person who has any present or future interest, vested or 
contingent.”265  However, other states had limited beneficiaries to 
those who were currently receiving income from the trust, thereby 
excluding remaindermen.266  Without adopting one view or the other, 
the court concluded that the settlor intended to limit the distribution 
of the trust corpus to Eric and Edward, and that he did not intend to 
include their heirs as possible beneficiaries.267  Consequently, the 
court held that the trial court should have granted Elizabeth’s 
petition to modify the distributive provisions of the trust.268 
C. Summary 
It is very difficult to terminate or modify an irrevocable trust 
in jurisdictions that follow the traditional rules.  While a trust can be 
terminated (even without court approval) if the settlor and all of the 
beneficiaries agree, such an agreement may be impossible to obtain if 
some of the trust beneficiaries are unborn or unascertained.  
Beneficiaries who wish to terminate a trust must overcome even 
greater obstacles when the trust is testamentary or when an inter 
vivos trust has become irrevocable because of the death of the settlor.  
In such cases, not only must all of the beneficiaries agree to terminate 
the trust, but, according to the Claflin Doctrine, they must also 
                                                   
 259  Id. 
 260  Id. 
 261  MO. REV. STAT. § 456.590 (2015).  See also Julia C. Walker, Get Your Dead Hands Off 
Me: Beneficiaries’ Right to Terminate or Modify a Trust Under the Uniform Trust Code, 67 
MO. L. REV. 443, 452-54 (2002). 
 262  Hamerstrom, 808 S.W.2d at 435. 
 263  Id. at 436-37. 
 264  Id. at 437. 
 265  Id. (quoting UNIF. PROB. CODE § 1-201(3) (2010)). 
 266  Id.  See also In re Trusts of Campbell, 258 N.W.2d 856, 861 (Minn. 1977); Lenzer v. 
Falk, 68 N.Y.S.2d 699 (Sup. Ct. 1947). 
 267  Hamerstrom, 808 S.W.2d at 438. 
 268  Id. 
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persuade a court that the proposed termination will not conflict with a 
material purpose of the trust.  The problem is compounded in states 
that assume as a matter of law that spendthrift trusts, discretionary 
trusts, support trusts, supplemental needs trusts, and trusts with 
time-based requirements for vesting embody a material purpose that 
is inconsistent with early termination. 
Modification is also difficult.  In theory, the equitable 
deviation doctrine allows a court to modify a trust in response to 
unforeseen circumstances.  However, in most states, the Claflin 
Doctrine’s material purpose requirement must be satisfied before a 
court will modify the provisions of a trust.  In addition, some courts 
interpret unforeseen circumstances in a way that restricts the scope of 
equitable deviation.  Finally, in many states, the equitable deviation 
doctrine is limited to the modification of administrative provisions, 
and does not permit a court to modify a trust’s distributive terms. 
III. NEW APPROACHES: THE UNIFORM TRUST CODE AND THE 
THIRD RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS 
Certain provisions of the Uniform Trust Code and the Third 
Restatement of Trusts, which were promulgated during the first 
decade of the twenty-first century, expanded the power of courts to 
modify or terminate irrevocable trusts.  This development chipped 
away at the traditional scope of dead hand control over trust property, 
and significantly expanded the rights of beneficiaries. 
A. Termination of Trusts 
The Uniform Trust Code was first promulgated in 2000, and 
was amended several times since that date.  Presently, almost half of 
the states have adopted the Code.269  The Restatement (Third) of 
Trusts was promulgated in 2003.  Both of these documents provide for 
the termination of trusts, although the Restatement’s provisions are 
somewhat less innovative than those of the Uniform Probate Code. 
1. The Uniform Trust Code § 411 
The prefatory note to article 4 of the Uniform Trust Code 
declares that the “overall objective of these sections is to enhance 
flexibility.”270  At the same time, the prefatory note qualifies this 
objective by adding that the goal of greater flexibility must be 
“consistent with the principle that preserving the settlor’s intent is 
                                                   
 269  See Richard C. Ausness, When Is a Trust Protector a Fiduciary? 27 QUINNIPIAC PROB. 
L.J. 277, 281 (2014) (citing Jesse Dukeminier & Robert H. Sitkoff, WILLS, TRUSTS & 
ESTATES 389 (9th ed. 2013)). 
 270  UNIF. TRUST CODE art. 4, gen. cmt. (2006). 
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paramount.”271  This sentiment was echoed by Professor David 
English, who described the Code’s balance between the need for 
increased flexibility and the need to give effect to the settlor’s intent 
as follows: 
Due to the increasing use in recent years of long-term trusts 
there is a need for greater flexibility in the restrictive rules that apply 
concerning when a trust may be terminated or modified other than as 
provided in the instrument.  The UTC provides for this increased 
flexibility but without disturbing the principle that the primary 
objective of trust law is to carry out the settlor’s intent.  The result is 
a liberalizing nudge, but one founded in traditional doctrine.272 
The provisions of section 411 are fairly consistent with the 
traditional approach to termination, as reflected in the Claflin 
Doctrine.273  Section 411(a) affirms the traditional rule that a trust 
may be terminated if the settlor and all of the beneficiaries agree to 
terminate it.274  Section 411(b) echoes the Claflin Doctrine by 
declaring that an “irrevocable trust may be terminated upon consent 
of all of the beneficiaries if the court concludes that continuance of the 
trust is not necessary to achieve any material purpose of the trust.”275  
However, section 411(c) departs somewhat from the traditional 
approach by stating that there is no presumption that the existence of 
a spendthrift clause in the trust constitutes a material purpose.276  
Moreover, section 411(e) provides that a court may terminate a trust, 
even when some of the beneficiaries do not consent, if (1) the court 
could terminate the trust if all of the beneficiaries could consent, and 
(2) the interests of non-consenting beneficiaries are adequately 
protected.277 
Furthermore, section 412(a) declares that a court may 
terminate a trust if, due to circumstances not anticipated by the 
settlor, termination would further the purposes of the trust.278  
Section 105(b)(4) states that these provisions are “mandatory rules,” 
which cannot be overridden by the settlor.279  Another provision of the 
Uniform Trust Code permits a court to remove a trustee not only for 
breach of trust, but also when removal is requested by all of the 
                                                   
 271  Id. 
 272  David M. English, The Uniform Trust Code (2000): Significant Provisions and Policy 
Issues, 67 MO. L. REV. 143, 169 (2002) (citations omitted). 
 273  See Unconditional Love, supra note 6, at 470. 
 274  UNIF. TRUST CODE § 411(a).  
 275  Id. § 411(b). 
 276  Id. § 411(c). 
 277  Id. § 411(e)(1-2). 
 278  Id. § 412(a). 
 279  UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105(b)(4). 
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beneficiaries, and the court finds that “removal of the trustee best 
serves the interests of all of the beneficiaries and is not inconsistent 
with a material purpose of the trust.”280  Finally, several provisions of 
the Code liberalize the rules relating to virtual representation, 
thereby making it easier to terminate a trust when some of the 
beneficiaries are unborn, underage, or unascertained.281 
2. The Restatement (Third) of Trusts 
Although their basic approaches are similar, the Restatement 
Third appears to give less weight to the settlor’s intent than the 
Uniform Trust Code does.282  For example, section 65(1) declares that 
“[e]xcept as stated in Subsection (2), if all of the beneficiaries of an 
irrevocable trust consent, they can compel the termination . . . of the 
trust.”283  However, section 65(2) provides that the beneficiaries 
cannot compel the termination of a trust if it “would be inconsistent 
with a material purpose of the trust” unless one of two conditions is 
met; either the settlor must consent to termination of the trust (a 
provision that is consistent with the traditional rule) or if the court 
“determines that the reason(s) for termination . . . outweigh the 
material purpose.”284 
The balancing test embodied in section 65(2) represents a 
marked departure from the traditional approach.285  This test was 
modeled after section 15403(b) of the California Probate Code, which 
declares: 
If the continuance of the trust is necessary to carry out a 
material purpose of the trust, the trust cannot be modified or 
terminated unless the court, in its discretion, determines that the 
reason for doing so under the circumstances outweighs the interest in 
accomplishing a material purpose of the trust.286 
Finally, comment a to section 65 changes the way the material 
purpose requirement is applied to spendthrift and discretionary 
provisions.287  Specifically, comment e states that while spendthrift 
and discretionary provisions may suggest that the settlor had a 
material purpose that would be inconsistent with early termination of 
the trust, these “restrictions are not sufficient in and of themselves to 
                                                   
 280  Id. § 706(b)(4) (2013). 
 281  Id. §§ 301-305 (2013). 
 282   See generally, UNIF. TRUST CODE, and RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS. 
 283  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 65(1). 
 284  Id. § 65(2). 
 285  See Unconditional Love, supra note 6, at 473. 
 286  CAL. PROB. CODE § 15403(b) (Deering 2015). 
 287  See Gallanis, supra note 51, at 228. 
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establish, or to create a presumption of, a material purpose that 
would prevent termination by consent of all of the beneficiaries.”288  
Taken together, these provisions make it easier for beneficiaries to 
obtain judicial termination of a trust. 
3. Recent Cases 
A number of courts have applied the termination provisions of 
the Uniform Trust Code and the Restatement Third during the last 
decade.289  However, in some instances, the courts have chosen to 
modify a trust instead of terminating it.  For example, in the case of 
In re Estate of Somers, the Kansas Supreme Court considered the 
effect of a spendthrift clause on a beneficiary’s right to terminate an 
irrevocable trust.290  In her will, Eula Somers established a 
testamentary trust in which she provided for monthly payments of 
$100.00 to each of her two grandchildren, Susan Somers and Kent 
Somers, for their lives with a gift over to the Shriners Hospitals for 
Crippled Children.291  The grandchildren’s interest was subject to a 
spendthrift clause.292  The trust corpus was about $120,000 at Eula’s 
death in 1956, but had grown to $3.5 million by 2001.293  At that time, 
Shriners Hospitals and the grandchildren reached an agreement 
under which Susan and Kent would each receive $150,000 and the 
remainder of the trust would be distributed to the Shriners 
Hospitals.294  When the beneficiaries sought judicial termination of 
the trust pursuant to their agreement, the lower court refused.295  
Instead, the court ordered a partial termination of the trust, with 
$500,000 to be retained to fund annuity payments to the 
grandchildren, and the remainder to be distributed to the Shriners 
Hospitals.296 
On appeal, the Kansas Supreme Court observed that the state 
legislature had recently enacted provisions of the Uniform Trust 
Code, including sections 410 and 411.297  The grandchildren relied on 
section 411(b) to support their petition for termination.298  In their 
                                                   
 288  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 65, general cmt. e. 
 289  See, e.g., Hamel, at1072, 299 P.3d at 286; In re Estate of Oswald, 45 Kan. App. 2d 106, 
244 P.3d 698 (2010); Somers, at 761, 89 P.3d at 898; Brams Trust v. Haydon, 266 S.W.3d 
300 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008); In re Cove Irrevocable Trust, 179 Vt. 587, 893 A.2d 344 (2006). 
 290  277 Kan. 761, 89 P.3d 898. 
 291  Id. at 762-63, 89 P.3d at 901. 
 292  Id. at 764-65, 89 P.3d at 902. 
 293  Id. at 762-63, 89 P.3d at 901. 
 294  Id. at 763, 89 P.3d at 901.  The Shriners Hospitals also agreed to continue the monthly 
payments to the grandchildren.  Somers, at 763, 89 P.3d at 901. 
 295  Id. at 763, 89 P.3d at 901.  
 296  Id. at 763-64, 89 P.3d at 901. 
 297  Id. at 765-66, 89 P.3d at 902-03. 
 298  Id. at 766, 89 P.3d at 903. 
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view, continuance of the trust was not necessary to achieve any 
material purpose.299  However, unlike the Uniform Trust Code’s 
version, the Kansas statute contained an additional provision, which 
declared that “[a] spendthrift provision in the terms of the trust is 
presumed to constitute a material purpose of the trust.”300  In light of 
this provision, the court ruled that the grandchildren were required to 
produce evidence to rebut the presumption raised by the statute.301  
However, they were unable to establish sufficient evidence.302  The 
court also rejected the argument that the proposed annuity could take 
the place of payments from the trust.303  According to the court, the 
annuity payments would not be protected from the claims of creditors 
and, therefore, would not satisfy the settlor’s protective objective as 
well as a spendthrift clause would.304  Nevertheless, relying on the 
equitable deviation principle embodied in section 412 of the Uniform 
Trust Code, the court concluded that the unexpected growth of the 
trust corpus justified a modification of its terms.305  Therefore, the 
court ordered: (1) for $500,000 to be retained in the trust and subject 
to the spendthrift clause, (2) the trustee make monthly payments to 
the grandchildren, and (3) the remainder of the trust corpus be 
distributed to Shriners Hospitals.306 
The Vermont case of In re Cove Irrevocable Trust, relying 
partly on the Third Restatement, also decided to modify a trust 
instead of terminating it.307  In that case, Anne Marden created a 
family trust, where the trust corpus consisted entirely of a certain 
piece of real property on Lake Champlain.308  The trust provided that 
the property was not to be sold until 2024, and the proceeds of the 
sale were to be divided among three of the settlor’s five children or 
their issue.309  In 2003, Anne’s sons, Elliot and George, brought an 
action in their capacity as trustees to permit the property to be 
sold.310  Anne originally opposed the sale, but eventually agreed to 
it.311  However, the parties failed to agree on the disposition of the 
sale proceeds, so the case went to trial.312  The trial court ruled that it 
                                                   
 299  Somers, 277 Kan. at 766, 89 P.3d at 903 
 300  Id. (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58a-411(c) (2003)). 
 301  Id. at 769, 89 P.3d at 905. 
 302  Id. 
 303  Id. at 767, 89 P.3d at 903. 
 304  Somers, at 767, 89 P.3d at 903. 
 305  Id. at 770, 89 P.3d at 905. 
 306  Id. at 771, 89 P.3d at 906. 
 307  179 Vt. 587, 893 A.2d 344. 
 308  Id. at 587, 893 A.2d at 345. 
 309  Id. 
 310  Id. 
 311  Id. at 587, 893 A.2d at 345. 
 312  Cove, at 587, 893 A.2d at 345. 
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was still possible to carry out the primary purpose of the trust, and 
refused to terminate it.313  Anne appealed the lower court’s judgment, 
claiming that the trust failed and the proceeds of the sale should have 
reverted to her by way of a resulting trust.314 
On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court agreed with the lower 
court that the primary goal of the trust was “to preserve assets for the 
use of Marden’s three named sons and their children.”315  The court 
determined that this goal could still be achieved if the trust was 
preserved and funded with the proceeds of the sale.316  The court 
expressly relied on section 66 of the Third Restatement to justify 
modifying the trust in this manner.317 
The beneficiaries were more successful in the Kansas case of 
In re the Estate of Oswald.318  The case involved a trust established by 
Irma Oswald and funded by a pour-over provision in her will.319  Irma 
died in 2008, survived by all five of her children.320  After Irma’s 
death, some of her children petitioned the court to terminate the trust 
and distribute its assets to the trust beneficiaries.321  One of her 
children, Lloyd, opposed termination, relying on a provision in the 
trust that allowed him to farm all real estate owned by the trust as 
long as he desired.322  As executor of Irma’s estate, Lloyd proposed to 
execute deeds for 1,340 acres of farmland to the various beneficiaries, 
but hold the deeds in escrow until he retired or ceased farming.323  
Another child, Henrietta Werth, objected to the proposal, and 
demanded that all of the trust assets, including title to Irma’s real 
property, be distributed immediately.324 
At trial, Lloyd argued that permitting him to farm the land 
was a “primary purpose” of the trust.325  In contrast, Henrietta 
maintained that the trust required the immediate distribution of the 
trust property at Irma’s death, and did not authorize Lloyd to hold 
title to any of the farmland in escrow.326  The trial court ruled that all 
of the trust assets, including title to the farmland, should be 
                                                   
 313  Id. at 588, 893 A.2d at 346. 
 314  Id. 
 315  Id.  
 316  Id. at 588-89, 893 A.2d at 347. 
 317  Cove, 179 Vt. at 588, 893 A.2d at 347. 
 318  45 Kan.App.2d 106, 244 P.3d 698. 
 319  Id. at 107-08, 244 P.3d at 699-700. 
 320  Id. at 109, 244 P.3d at 701. 
 321  Id. at 107, 244 P.3d at 699. 
 322  Id. at 109, 244 P.3d at 700. 
 323  Oswald, at 109, 244 P.3d at 701. 
 324  Id. at 110, 244 P.3d at 701. 
 325  Id. at 110-11, 244 P.3d at 701-02. 
 326  Id. at 111, 244 P.3d at 702. 
AUSNESS.MACRO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/20/15  3:19 PM 
2015]   THE MODIFICATION AND TERMINATION OF IRREVOCABLE TRUSTS 269 
 
immediately distributed to the trust beneficiaries.327  It also declared 
that Lloyd could farm the land as a tenant of his other siblings.328 
On appeal, the Kansas Court of Appeals agreed that Irma 
intended for the trust to terminate at her death, and rejected the 
claim that the trust should continue as long as Lloyd conducted 
farming operations on the land.329  In doing so, the court also rejected 
the assertion that protecting Lloyd’s right to farm was a material 
purpose of the trust.330  Quoting from section 65 of the Third 
Restatement, the court declared that it would not readily infer a 
material purpose; instead, the proponent would be required to provide 
evidence of a “particular concern or objective on the part of the 
settlor.”331  The court found that the settlor could have given Lloyd a 
life estate in the property if protecting his right to farm was an 
overriding concern,332 and therefore, it affirmed the trial court’s 
judgment.333 
Finally, Brams Trust v. Haydon334 provides an interesting 
insight on use of virtual representation in a petition to terminate a 
trust under section 411(b) of the Uniform Trust Code.335  The Brams 
case involved a testamentary trust established by the will of Harriett 
Brams.336  The trust authorized the trustees, in the exercise of their 
discretion, to distribute any or all of the trust income to Harriett’s 
grandson, Michael Brams.337  Michael was also given a testamentary 
power of appointment to distribute portions of the trust corpus to his 
descendants, born or unborn.338  If Michael failed to appoint the trust 
property, it would be distributed to his issue then living, per stirpes, 
as takers in default.339  Harriett died in 2002; in 2005, Michael filed a 
petition to terminate the trust pursuant to section 411(b) of the 
                                                   
 327  Id. 
 328  Oswald, at 111, 244 P.3d at 702. 
 329  Id. at 112-13, 244 P.3d at 702-03. 
 330  Id. at 114, 244 P.3d at 703. 
 331  Id.  
 332  Id.  
 333  Oswald, at 111, 244 P.3d at 702. 
 334  266 S.W.3d 300 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008). 
 335  Virtual representation allows a living member of a beneficiary class, a fiduciary or a 
parent to represent the interests of unborn, unknown or underage members of the class in 
litigation and family settlements.  See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 304 (2013); Susan T. Bart & 
Lyman W. Welch, State Statutes on Virtual Representation—A New State Survey, 35 
ACTEC J. 368 (2009).  
 336  Haydon, 266 S.W.3d at 302. 
 337  Id. 
 338  Id. 
 339  Id. 
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Missouri Uniform Trust Code.340 
At the time the petition was filed, Michael was thirty-two 
years old and had no children.341  The trial court issued an order to 
terminate the trust, but made no finding that the unborn or 
unascertained beneficiaries of the trust would benefit from its early 
termination.342  However, this finding was required by a state statute 
that governed irrevocable trusts created before 2005.343  The trial 
court assumed that section 456.3-302 allowed Michael to represent 
potential appointees and takers in default in his petition for 
termination.344  The statute declared that “[t]he holder of a 
testamentary power of appointment may represent and bind persons 
whose interests, as permissible appointees, takers in default, or 
otherwise, are subject to the power.”345  However, the appeals court 
concluded that Michael was given a special, not a general, power of 
appointment; therefore, he could not represent the interests of the 
takers in default.346  Since Michael had not met the requirements of 
section 456.590.2, the court held that the trial court erred in 
terminating the trust.347 
B. Modification of Trusts 
1. The Uniform Trust Code 
Several provisions of the Uniform Trust Code are concerned 
with the modification of trusts.  Section 411 follows the traditional 
approach by allowing the settlor and the trust beneficiaries to modify 
the terms of the trust by unanimous agreement.348  This section also 
allows a trust to be modified by the beneficiaries alone if the proposed 
modification is not inconsistent with a material purpose of the 
trust.349  Section 412 also adopts the traditional view by declaring 
that a court may modify the terms of a trust when, because of 
circumstances not anticipated by the settlor, modification is necessary 
to further the purposes of the trust.350  Section 412(a) expands the 
conventional doctrine of equitable deviation by expressly stating that 
a court may modify a trust’s distributive provisions if such action is 
                                                   
 340  Haydon, 266 S.W.3d at 302. 
 341  Id. at 303. 
 342  Id. 
 343  MO. REV. STAT. § 456.590 (2015). 
 344  Haydon, 266 S.W.3d at 304. 
 345  Id. (quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 456.3-302 (2014)). 
 346  Id. at 305. 
 347  Id. at 306. 
 348  See English, supra note 272, at 169-70. 
 349  Id. at 170. 
 350  UNIF. TRUST CODE § 412(a) (2013). 
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necessary to further trust purposes.351  In addition, section 412(b) 
allows a court, without regard to changed circumstances, to modify an 
administrative provision if continuing the trust on its existing terms 
would be impracticable, wasteful, or would impair the trust’s 
administration.352  Section 414 authorizes courts to modify a trust 
when the trust property is insufficient to justify the cost of 
administration.353  Section 416 authorizes a court to modify a trust in 
order to achieve the settlor’s tax objectives.354  Finally, section 706 
allows a court to remove a trustee without cause when requested by 
the beneficiaries.355 
2. The Restatement (Third) of Trusts 
Sections 65 and 66 of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts also 
reflect some new thinking about the modification of trusts.  Section 
65, which applies to both termination and modification, declares that 
the beneficiaries of an irrevocable trust may modify the trust if all 
consent and the proposed modification is not inconsistent with a 
material purpose of the trust.356  If the material purpose requirement 
is not satisfied, the beneficiaries can still compel modification if the 
settlor consents or if a court determines that the reasons for the 
proposed modification outweigh the material purpose.357  As 
previously mentioned, this balancing approach weakens the material 
purpose requirement, making it easier for a court to modify the terms 
of a trust.358  Furthermore, unlike section 66, this provision does not 
require a finding of unanticipated circumstances.359 
Section 66 sets forth the Restatement’s version of the 
equitable deviation doctrine.  It provides that: 
The court may modify an administrative or distributive 
provision of a trust, or direct or permit the trustee to deviate from an 
administrative or distributive provision, if because of circumstances 
not anticipated by the settlor the modification or deviation will 
further the purposes of the trust.360 
This language broadens the scope of the traditional equitable 
deviation doctrine in several respects.  First, it clearly states that a 
                                                   
 351  See English, supra note 272, at 172. 
 352  Id. at 172-73. 
 353  Id. at 173-74. 
 354  Id. at 175.   
 355  UNIF. TRUST CODE § 706. 
 356  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 65(2). 
 357  Id. 
 358  See Unconditional Love, supra note 6, at 450. 
 359  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 66, general cmt. a (2003). 
 360  Id. at § 66(1). 
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court may modify distributive, as well as administrative, provisions of 
a trust.  Second, comment a states that section 66 does not require a 
showing of changed circumstances; instead, proponents of 
modification merely have to show that “the settlor was unaware of the 
circumstances in establishing the terms of the trust.”361 
3. Recent Cases 
In recent years, a number of cases have tackled various issues 
raised by the modification provisions of the Uniform Trust Code and 
the Third Restatement of Trusts.  First, the material purpose 
requirement remains an issue as the case of In re Trust D Created 
Under Last Will & Testament of Darby illustrates.362  Senator Harry 
Darby established several testamentary trusts for the benefit of his 
sister and daughters.363  Trust D provided a payment of $4,000 to one 
of the daughters, Marjorie Alford, during her lifetime, with a gift over 
to Marjorie’s daughters for their lives and then to the issue of each of 
her daughters.364  The trust also contained a spendthrift clause.365  
Darby later increased Marjorie’s annual distribution to $24,000 per 
year.366  Darby died in 1987, and in 2009, Marjorie petitioned the 
court to modify Trust D to increase her annual payments to $40,000 
per year.367  Marjorie claimed that payments from the trust were no 
longer adequate to satisfy her basic living expenses.368  All of the 
qualified trust beneficiaries consented to the proposed modification, 
and the lower court approved Marjorie’s petition.369 
Reviewing the lower court’s actions, the appeals court 
considered whether it was authorized to modify the trust under two 
state statutes that corresponded to sections 411(b) and 412(a) of the 
Uniform Trust Code.370  The court began by observing that a trust 
cannot be modified under section 411(b), notwithstanding the fact 
that all of the beneficiaries have consented, unless it is consistent 
with a material purpose of the trust.371  In order to determine whether 
that requirement was met, the court had to identify the trust’s 
material purpose.  Quoting from one of the Third Restatement’s 
comments, the court declared that material purposes could not be 
                                                   
 361  Id. at § 66, general cmt. a. 
 362  290 Kan. 785, 234 P.3d 793. 
 363  Id. at 787, 234 P.3d at 796. 
 364  Id. at 787-88, 234 P.3d at 796-97. 
 365  Id. at 788, 234 P.3d at 797. 
 366  Darby, at 788, 234 P.3d at 797. 
 367  Id.  
 368  Id. at 789, 234 P.3d at 798. 
 369  Id. at 789-90, 234 P.3d at 798. 
 370  Id. at 790-91, 234 P.3d at 798-99. 
 371  Darby, at 791, 234 P.3d at 799. 
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readily inferred.372  A material purpose requires the proponent to 
show that the settlor had a particular concern or objective in creating 
the trust.373 
Applying this rule, the court rejected Marjorie’s contention 
that a material purpose of the trust was to provide for her basic 
support.374  It noted that the trust was not a support trust; rather, it 
provided for a specific payment to Marjorie without any connection to 
her support needs.375  On the other hand, the court determined that 
the presence of a spendthrift provision in the trust indicated that one 
of the settlor’s material purposes for the trust was to protect the 
interests of the remainder beneficiaries.376  An increase in 
distributions to Marjorie would be inconsistent with that objective.377  
Consequently, the court concluded Marjorie’s request was not 
authorized by section 411(b).378 
A number of other cases have also been decided recently under 
the Uniform Trust Code and Third Restatement regimes.379  For 
example, in the case of In re Nobbe, the Indiana Appellate Court, 
relied on section 412 of the Uniform Trust Code and suggested that 
equitable deviation could be used to modify the distributive provisions 
of a trust.380  The case involved a dispute among nine brothers and 
sisters over the terms of a testamentary trust created by their father 
in 1982.381  The testator, Edwin Nobbe, bequeathed to his wife, 
Loretta, an amount sufficient to obtain the maximum marital estate 
tax deduction.382  The remainder of Edwin’s estate was to be placed in 
trust with Loretta as the income beneficiary.383  At her death, the 
corpus of the trust was to be distributed to Edwin’s children free of 
trust.384  However, Item VII of the will left certain bank stock in equal 
shares to three of Edwin’s children, Marlene, Herman, and Susan.385  
At Edwin’s death, his personal representative transferred 500 shares 
                                                   
 372  Id. at 792, 234 P.3d at 799 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 64, cmt. d 
(2003)). 
 373  Id. 
 374  Id. 
 375  Id. at 791-92, 234 P.3d at 799. 
 376  Darby, at 792, 234 P.3d at 799. 
 377  Id. at 793, 234 P.3d at 800. 
 378  Id. 
 379  See, e.g., Ruby G. Owen Trust ex rel. Owen, 2012 Ark. 381, 418 S.W.3d 421, 422 (2012); 
Chapman, 953 N.E.2d at 580-82); In re Nobbe, 831 N.E.2d 835 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005); Darby, 
290 Kan. 785, 234 P.3d 793; In re Riddell, 138 Wash. App. 485, 157 P.3d 888 (2007). 
 380  831 N.E.2d 835. 
 381  Id. at 836-37. 
 382  Id. at 837. 
 383  Id. 
 384  Id. at 837. 
 385  Nobbe, 831 N.E.2d at 838.  
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of the bank stock, then worth $40,000, to the trust.386  However, 
during the period between Edwin’s death in 1982 and Loretta’s death 
in 2003, changes in the banking laws caused the stock to increase in 
value by more than $3 million.387 
Shortly after Loretta’s death, the Trustee petitioned for 
instructions regarding distribution of the trust corpus to the 
children.388  Later, in a separate petition, the other children (“the 
Appellees”) argued that Edwin merely intended to leave Marlene, 
Herman, and Susan (“the Appellants”) the value of the stock at the 
time of his death ($40,000).389  Alternatively, the Appellees asked the 
court to approve a deviation from the trust because “‘the distribution 
of the trust proposed by the Trustee would defeat or substantially 
impair the accomplishment of the purposes of the trust, that is 
Edwin’s intent to treat his nine children ‘equally or substantially 
equally.’”390  The trial court agreed with this interpretation and 
ordered the trustee to distribute $40,000 to the Appellants, and to 
distribute the remaining stock in equal shares to all nine children.391  
The Appellants then appealed.392 
The appeals court held that the will, by its express terms, 
made a specific bequest of the bank stock to the Appellants.393  
Therefore, unless the will was modified, all of the bank stock, 
including dividends and accretions, would be distributed to the 
Appellants when the trust is terminated.394  The court considered the 
Appellees’ argument that Edwin intended to treat all of his children 
more or less equally, and his failure to foresee changes in state 
banking laws constituted an unforeseen circumstance that completely 
impaired his estate plan.395  In response, the Appellants contended 
that equitable deviation only allowed a court to modify the 
administrative provisions of a trust.396  However, the Appellees 
pointed out that both the Third Restatement and section 412(a) of the 
Uniform Trust Code provided that equitable deviation could be 
applied to modify distributive as well as administrative provisions of a 
trust.397  Furthermore, the appeals court noted, the state legislature 
                                                   
 386  Id.  
 387  Id. 
 388  Id. at 838-39. 
 389  Id. at 839. 
 390  Nobbe, 831 N.E.2d. at 839. 
 391  Id. 
 392  Id. 
 393  Id. at 840. 
 394  Id. at 841. 
 395  Nobbe, 831 N.E.2d. at 841. 
 396  Id. at 841-42. 
 397  Id. at 842. 
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had recently adopted the Uniform Trust Code, including § 412(a).398 
The final question considered was whether significant changes 
in state banking laws were unforeseeable to the testator.  The court 
concluded that this was not the sort of unforeseen circumstance that 
was required to justify the use of equitable deviation.399  In the first 
place, the court determined that changes in state banking laws were 
foreseeable, and that officers of the bank informed shareholders – 
including Edwin – as early as 1979 that such changes were likely to 
occur in the future.400  In addition, the court declared that an increase 
in the value of a trust asset was not the sort of economic change that 
the Restatement and the Uniform Trust Code considered to be 
sufficient to invoke the doctrine of equitable deviation.401  The court 
concluded by declaring that “[w]e will not, over twenty years later, 
step in and redistribute Edwin’s estate in an attempt to equalize the 
devises at this point in time.”402  Accordingly, it reversed the lower 
court’s judgment in favor of the Appellees.403 
However, unforeseen circumstances may be sufficient to allow 
the conversion of an ordinary beneficial interest into one protected by 
a supplemental needs trust.404  For example, in the case of In Re 
Riddell,405 a Washington appeals court invoked the Restatement 
(Third) of Trusts to authorize a lower court to employ equitable 
deviation to convert the interest of one of the settlor’s grandchildren 
into a supplemental needs trust.406  George and Irene Riddell had 
created several trusts for the benefit of their son, Ralph, and his wife 
Beverly, as well as Ralph’s children, Donald and Nancy.407  The trusts 
provided, inter alia, that after Ralph and Beverly died, Donald and 
Nancy would receive the trust corpus when they reached the age of 
thirty-five.408  Unfortunately, Nancy suffered from a number of 
serious psychological disorders and was confined to a state mental 
                                                   
 398  Id. 
 399  Id. at 842-43. 
 400  Nobbe, 831 N.E.2d. at 842-43. 
 401  Id. at 843. 
 402  Id. at 843. 
 403  Id. 
 404  See Owen, at 381, 418 S.W.3d at 422; White v. Kan. Health Policy Auth., 40 Kan. App. 
2d 971, 981, 198 P.3d 172, 180 (2008); Riddell, 138 Wash. App. at 485, 157 P.3d at 888.  “A 
supplemental needs trust is a trust that is established for the disabled person’s benefit and 
that is intended to supplement public benefits without increasing countable assets and 
resources so as to disqualify the individual from public benefits.”  Riddell, 138 Wash.App. at 
495, 157 P.3d at 892. 
 405  Riddell, 138 Wash.App. 485, 157 P.3d 888. 
 406  Id. at 488, 157 P.3d at 889. 
 407  Id. at 488-89, 157 P.3d at 889-90. 
 408  Id. at 489, 157 P.3d at 890. 
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hospital.409 
In his capacity as trustee of the Riddell trusts, Ralph filed a 
petition asking the court to modify the trust so that Nancy’s share 
would not be distributed to her outright, but instead transferred to a 
supplemental needs trust so that it would not be subject to 
attachment by the state for the cost of her health care.410  At the time 
the petition was brought, both Donald and Nancy had reached the age 
of thirty-five, and would receive the trust corpus outright at their 
parents’ deaths.411  However, the trial court refused to modify the 
trusts because it concluded that, even if the settlors did not foresee 
Nancy’s mental situation, converting her interest into a supplemental 
needs trust would not further the overall purpose of the trust.412  On 
appeal, Ralph argued that the equitable deviation doctrine, as set 
forth in the Third Restatement, authorized a court to modify a trust 
in the manner requested.413  He contended that the settlors, by 
requiring their grandchildren to reach the age of thirty-five before 
receiving the trust assets, demonstrated an intent that they achieve a 
certain level of maturity and stability before obtaining full ownership 
of the trust property.414  Had they anticipated Nancy’s debilitating 
mental condition, the Riddells would not have left the trust property 
to her outright.415 
The appeals court declared that it would rely on the 
Washington Supreme Court’s analysis of equitable deviation in 
Niemann v. Vaughn Community Church,416 which applied that 
doctrine to modify the administrative provisions of a charitable 
trust.417  According to the appeals court, the court in Niemann 
adopted a two-pronged approach to determine if modification of a 
trust is permissible.418  This approach is based on the Third 
Restatement, and states that a court may modify an administrative or 
distributive provision: (1) “because of circumstances not anticipated 
by the settlor,” and (2) “the modification or deviation would further 
the purposes of the trust.”419  According to the Riddell court, the 
Restatement gave courts broader discretion in the area of trust 
modification than the traditional rule. 
                                                   
 409  Id. 
 410  Riddell, 138 Wash.App. at 489, 157 P.3d at 890. 
 411  Id. 
 412  Id. at 491, 157 P.3d at 890-91. 
 413  Id. at 492, 157 P.3d at 891. 
 414  Id. at 492-93, 157 P.3d at 891. 
 415  Riddell, 138 Wash.App. at 492, 157 P.3d at 891. 
 416  Id. at 493, 157 P.3d at 891 (citing Niemann, 154 Wash. 2d 365, 113 P.3d 463). 
 417  Id.  
 418  Id. at 493, 157 P.3d at 891-92. 
 419  Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS (internal citations omitted)). 
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Applying these criteria, the court in Riddell determined that 
Nancy’s grandparents could not have anticipated that she would 
become mentally incapacitated and unable to manage her financial 
affairs.420  Nor could they have anticipated passage of federal 
legislation that authorized the creation of supplemental needs 
trusts.421  Furthermore, the court found that these changed 
circumstances had frustrated the settlors’ intent that Nancy be given 
the trust property to use as she saw fit.422  Consequently, the court 
concluded that since Nancy would never be able to manage the trust 
as she chose, transferring the funds to a supplemental needs trust 
would at least protect it from attachment by the state during her 
lifetime.423  Therefore, the court remanded the case back to the trial 
court, and directed it to “order such equitable deviation as is 
consistent with the settlors’ intent in light of changed 
circumstances.”424 
A change in the tax laws is another type of unforeseen 
circumstance that has led trustees and beneficiaries to petition courts 
to modify a trust under the doctrine of equitable deviation.425  As 
previously discussed, section 416 of the Uniform Trust Code 
specifically authorizes courts to modify trust provisions in response to 
changes in existing tax laws, as long as the proposed modification is 
not contrary to the settlor’s probable intent.426  However, section 416’s 
“probable intent” language may create problems when the proposed 
modification changes the trust’s distributive provisions. 
This issue arose in the Darby case,427 discussed supra Section 
III.B.3.  In that case, Marjorie Alford asked the court to grant her a 
limited testamentary power of appointment.428  The purpose was to 
vest the assets of the trust in her estate, thereby subjecting them to 
federal estate tax liability, but not to federal generation-skipping 
transfer (“GST”) tax liability.429  Because the estate tax exemption 
exceeded the value of the trust, the proposed modification would have 
reduced the Darby family’s overall tax liability.430  According to 
                                                   
 420  Riddell, 138 Wash.App. at 494, 157 P.3d at 892. 
 421  Id. at 494-95, 157 P.3d at 892. 
 422  Id. at 494, 157 P.3d at 892. 
 423  Id. at 495-96, 157 P.3d at 893. 
 424  Id. at 496, 157 P.3d at 893. 
 425  See Darby, at 795, 234 P.3d at 798-99; In re Harris Testamentary Trust, 275 Kan. 946, 
69 P.3d 1109 (2003); Head v. Head, 261 Ore. App. 471, 483, 323 P.3d 505, 507 (2014). 
 426  UNIF. TRUST CODE § 416 (2013).  
 427  See Darby, 290 Kan. 785, 234 P.3d 793). 
 428  Id. at 796, 234 P.3d at 801. 
 429  Id. 
 430  Id.  On the other hand, if the trust property had been distributed to Darby’s 
grandchildren as his will provided, it would have been subjected to a 45% tax rate under the 
provisions of GST tax.  Id. at 802. 
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Marjorie, at the time the trust was created, a GST could effectively 
avoid federal estate taxation on trust assets passed to each 
generation; however, changes in the federal GST tax and increases in 
the estate tax exemption seriously undercut Darby’s GST strategy.431 
Although the court conceded that Darby “could have done a far better 
job of tax planning had he desired to avoid the GSTT implications for 
Trust D,” it nevertheless refused to modify the trust because the 
proposed modification was completely contrary to the settlor’s 
intent.432  His intent was reflected by the presence of a spendthrift 
clause in his will, which would preserve the trust’s assets for the 
second and third generations.433 
Finally, section 706 of the Uniform Trust Code allows a court 
to remove a trustee without cause at the request of the 
beneficiaries.434  By threatening to have the trustee removed, the 
living beneficiaries can pressure the trustee to modify the trust terms 
(if the trustee has the power to do so) in a way that is more to their 
liking.435  Davis v. U.S. Bank National Association provides an 
illustration of the Code’s expansive approach to trustee removal.436  In 
that case, Lorenz Ayers executed a trust instrument that appointed 
National Association as trustee, and named Harold Davis as the 
income beneficiary.437  After Harold’s death, the trust corpus was to 
be divided among his living children in equal shares.438  If there were 
no surviving children, the trust property was to go to Lorenz’s heirs at 
law, and otherwise to Lafayette College in Pennsylvania.439  At the 
time of the litigation, Harold had two children, Dillon and 
Marguerite.440 
In 2006, Harold filed a petition to remove National as trustee, 
transfer the situs of the trust to Delaware, and appoint a Delaware 
trust company as trustee.441  There was no allegation of wrongdoing 
by National; however, Harold argued that its removal as trustee 
would serve the interests of all of the trust beneficiaries, and would 
not be inconsistent with a material purpose of the trust.442  Affirming 
the lower court, the appellate court concluded that a state statute 
                                                   
 431  Darby, at 797, 234 P.3d at 802. 
 432  Id. at 799, 234 P.3d at 803. 
 433  Id. at 799-800, 234 P.3d at 803-04. 
 434  UNIF. TRUST CODE § 706(b)(4). 
 435  See Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 8, at 1335.  
 436  243 S.W.3d 425 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007). 
 437  Id. at 426. 
 438  Id. 
 439  Id. 
 440  Id. 
 441  Davis, 243 S.W.3d at 426. 
 442  Id. 
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based on section 706(b)(4) of the Uniform Trust Code authorized the 
court to remove the current trustee because the petitioner had 
presented evidence that the Delaware trustee would charge lower fees 
for the same level of service.443 
C. Summary 
Both the Uniform Trust Code and the Third Restatement have 
relaxed the traditional rules regarding termination and modification 
of trusts.444  Insofar as termination is concerned, section 411(b) 
appears to reaffirm the Claflin Doctrine.  However, section 411(c) 
qualifies this by eliminating the presumption that a spendthrift 
provision indicates that the settlor would not want to terminate the 
trust prematurely.  In addition, section 411(e) does away with the 
requirement that all beneficiaries consent to the termination of a 
trust.  Finally, section 412 allows a court to terminate a trust when 
circumstances arise that were not anticipated by the settlor if 
termination would further the purposes of the trust.  Thus, these 
provisions significantly liberalize the traditional requirements for 
termination. 
The Third Restatement goes even further in this direction.  
Section 65(2) allows a court to terminate a trust if it determines that 
the reasons supporting termination outweigh a material purpose of 
the trust.  In addition, comment e to section 65 declares that 
spendthrift and discretionary provisions do not create a presumption 
that early termination was contrary to a material purpose of the 
trust. 
The Uniform Trust Code and the Third Restatement have also 
made it easier for courts to modify the terms of a trust.  For example, 
section 412(a) of the Uniform Trust Code expands the equitable 
deviation doctrine by authorizing a court to modify the distributive 
provisions of a trust if it concludes that modification is necessary to 
further the purposes of the trust.  Furthermore, section 412(b) allows 
a court to modify administrative provisions, even in the absence of 
changed circumstances, if retaining the existing trust terms would be 
impracticable, wasteful, or would impair the administration of the 
trust.  Section 66 of the Third Restatement also extends the equitable 
deviation doctrine to distributive provisions, and allows a court to 
modify the terms of a trust in the absence of changed circumstances if 
it concludes that the settlor was unaware of an existing circumstance 
at the time the trust was established. 
 
                                                   
 443  Id. at 431. 
 444  See Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 8, at 1329.  
AUSNESS.MACRO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/20/15  3:19 PM 
280 QUINNIPIAC PROBATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 28 
 
IV. MODIFICATION AND TERMINATION BY TRUSTEES AND 
TRUST PROTECTORS 
Although trust beneficiaries may agree among themselves to 
modify or terminate the terms of a trust, trustees may seek judicial 
approval to protect themselves against potential liability for failing to 
carry out the original terms of the trust.  A judicial decree may also be 
required if some of the beneficiaries are unborn, underage, or 
undetermined.  Furthermore, even though the Uniform Trust Code 
and the Third Restatement have liberalized the traditional rules 
relating to the modification and termination of trusts, they still 
contemplate that judicial authorization will be needed in most 
instances.445  However, this sort of judicial involvement in trust 
management is not always desirable, either from the perspective of 
the trustee, the trust beneficiaries, or the efficient management of 
judicial resources.446  Fortunately, settlors can employ a number of 
devices to avoid the need for judicial action.  Essentially, these 
alternatives involve authorizing a trustee or a trust protector to 
terminate or modify a trust without the need for judicial approval. 
A. Modification or Termination by a Trustee 
For many years, courts have upheld the exercise of a trustee’s 
discretion in terminating a trust.447  However, two related questions 
have arisen in connection with the exercise of this power: (1) what 
standard of conduct applies to a trustee’s exercise of this power; and 
(2) what standard of review should apply when a court is called upon 
to evaluate the propriety of a trustee’s actions?  Both of these issues 
arose in American Cancer Society, St. Louis Division v. 
Hammerstein.448  In that case, Lena Kohler established a 
testamentary trust for her daughter, Virginia Knoll, and son-in-law, 
John Knoll, Jr.449 Under the terms of the trust, Virginia was to 
receive the income from the trust during her lifetime; at her death, if 
John survived Virginia, he would receive the income from the trust 
until his death or remarriage.450  However, the trustee had discretion 
to terminate the trust during the lifetime of Virginia or John when 
                                                   
 445  See Perpetual Trusts, supra note 200, at 609.  
 446  See Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 8, at 1331.  
 447  See, e.g., Matter of McManus’ Estate, 407 N.Y.S.2d 180, 184, 62 A.D.2d 758, 764 (1978); 
In re Eckert’s Trust, 23 A.D.2d 32, 35-36, 258 N.Y.S.2d 539, 543 (1965); In re Estate of 
Fishberg, 158 Misc. 3, 285 N.Y.S. 303, 307 (Sur. Ct. 1936); Major v. Major, 177 A.D. 102, 163 
N.Y.S. 925 (1917).  See also UNIF. TRUST CODE § 808(c) (declaring that “[t]he terms of the 
trust may confer upon a trustee . . . a power to direct the modification or termination of the 
trust.”  See also Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 8, at 1332 (highlighting that a non-trustee 
can be given a non-fiduciary special power of appointment to appoint trust principal).  
 448  631 S.W.2d 858 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981). 
 449  Id. at 860. 
 450  Id. at 861. 
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either became the sole beneficiary of the trust.451  Finally, if the trust 
did not terminate at the death (or remarriage) of the last income 
beneficiary, the trustee was directed to distribute the trust corpus to 
various other beneficiaries, including the American Cancer Society.452 
Virginia died in 1966, and John became the trust’s sole income 
beneficiary.453  In 1970, the trustee notified the remainder 
beneficiaries that he intended to terminate the trust and distribute 
the trust corpus to John.454  The trust owned one-third of the shares of 
the Kohler City Supply Company, a closely held corporation.455  John 
“and four long-time employees of the company owned the remaining 
shares.”456  Both John and the trustee, Robert Hammerstein, were 
also officers and directors of the corporation.457  Hammerstein later 
testified that he decided to terminate the trust in order to prevent 
“chaos in the company,” as he feared would occur if the shares in the 
trust were divided among a large number of beneficiaries.458 
Upon receiving notice of the pending termination, the 
American Cancer Society challenged the right of the trustee to 
terminate the trust.459  The litigation lasted for more than ten 
years.460  The lower court ruled that the attempted termination was 
void because the trustee “unintentionally, in error and through 
mistake” abused his discretion.461  However, the lower court’s 
judgment was reversed on appeal.462  The appeals court began its 
analysis of the case by declaring: 
When a testator vests sole discretion in a matter in the trustee 
and supplies no objective standards by which to evaluate the 
reasonableness of his conduct, a court must not interfere unless the 
trustee, in exercising his power, [willfully] abuses his discretion or 
acts arbitrarily, fraudulently, dishonestly or with an improper 
                                                   
 451  Id. at 860. 
 452  Id. at 859. 
 453  Hammerstein, 631 S.W.2d at 861. 
 454  Id. at 860. 
 455  Id. at 861. 
 456  Id. 
 457  Id. 
 458  Hammerstein, 631 S.W.2d at 861-62.  The remainder beneficiaries included four 
churches, two charities and forty-two individuals or their descendants.  Id. 
 459  Id. at 860. 
 460  Id. 
 461  Id. at 862. 
 462  Hammerstein, 631 S.W.2d at 863.  The appeals court concluded that the trust was 
terminated in 1970 when the trustee announced his intention to terminate the trust and 
distribute the trust corpus to John.  Id. at 860.  Although the trust assets were not 
distributed until the end of the litigation, the court held that the trust property vested in 
John when the trust was terminated in 1970.  Id. at 865. 
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motive.463 
The court then determined that the settlor had clearly 
expressed an intent to give the trustee absolute discretion to 
terminate the trust and distribute the trust property to John.464  
Consequently, the court concluded that the trial court erred in 
overruling the trustee’s decision to terminate on the grounds that he 
acted “unintentionally, erroneously and mistakenly.”465  According to 
the court, the trustee’s decision would prevail unless there was a 
“willful abuse of discretion or bad faith on his part.”466  In this case, 
there was no finding by the appeals court that the trustee had acted 
arbitrarily, dishonestly or fraudulently, or intentionally abused his 
discretion.467  Furthermore, the court observed that the contingent 
beneficiaries could not challenge the trustee’s decision simply because 
it extinguished their interest in the trust.468  Finally, the court stated 
that the trustee was not obligated to seek a court’s advice or 
permission before acting to terminate the trust.469 
The extinguishment of contingent interests was also at issue 
in Croslow v. Croslow.470  The settlor, John Louis Croslow, established 
an inter vivos trust under which the trustees were given the discretion 
to pay income from the trust to Croslow or his wife and children.471  
The trustees were also authorized to terminate the trust and 
distribute the trust corpus to John, if living, or to his heirs, personal 
representative, or devisees.472  The principal asset of the trust was a 
tract of land leased to the Marathon Oil Company for the production 
of natural gas.473  In 1972, the trustees terminated the trust and 
conveyed the property to John and his wife, Marguerite, as joint 
tenants.474  John died in 1973, and his children by a prior marriage 
brought suit against Marguerite, claiming that they were trust 
beneficiaries since the trustee had discretion to pay some of the trust 
income to them.475 
The children contended that the trustees’ action constituted a 
modification of the trust, requiring the consent of all of the trust 
                                                   
 463  Id. at 863. 
 464  Id. 
 465  Hammerstein, 631 S.W.2d at 863. 
 466  Id. 
 467  Id. 
 468  Id. at 864. 
 469  Id. at 865. 
 470  38 Ill. App. 3d 373, 347 N.E.2d 800 (1976). 
 471  Id. at 374-75, 347 N.E.2d at 801-02. 
 472  Id. at 374, 347 N.E.2d at 801. 
 473  Id. at 375, 347 N.E.2d at 802. 
 474  Id. at 376, 347 N.E.2d at 802. 
 475  Croslow, at 376, 347 N.E.2d at 802-03. 
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beneficiaries.476  However, the court distinguished between a judicial 
modification and the trust instrument that gives the power to 
terminate to the trustee.477  Furthermore, the court held that if the 
trustee was empowered to distribute the trust property to a 
beneficiary upon termination, he could also distribute some or all of 
the property to a third person at the request of the beneficiary.478  
Therefore, the delivery of a deed from the trustee to John and 
Marguerite as joint tenants did not constitute an improper transfer of 
trust property to a non-beneficiary.479  Finally, the court declared that 
“although the children of John Louis Croslow were in fact 
beneficiaries under the trust while the trust was in operation upon 
termination by the trustees in accordance with the discretionary 
power of the trust, the children’s rights as beneficiaries were 
extinguished.”480  Accordingly, the appeals court affirmed the 
judgment of the lower court.481 
In Major v. Major,482 a New York court allowed a trustee to 
terminate a trust for his own benefit even though his action 
extinguished the remainder interest of his infant son.483  Major 
involved a provision in the will of Richard Major, which created 
income interests in trusts for each of his three sons, Frank, Richard, 
and George.484  The will also provided that the trust corpus would be 
distributed to each son’s issue at his death.485  Finally, the testator 
declared that his executors “in the exercise of their discretion” could 
terminate any of the trusts and distribute the trust property to the 
income beneficiaries.486  Richard appointed each of his three sons as 
executors of his estate.487  When Frank and George died, Richard 
became the sole executor and trustee.488  In that capacity, Richard 
decided to terminate the testamentary trust and take his share of his 
father’s estate free of trust.489  However, Richard’s infant son, 
Richard, Jr., challenged this action in court through a guardian ad 
litem.490  On an appeal from a decision upholding the termination, the 
                                                   
 476  Id. at 377, 347 N.E.2d at 803. 
 477  Id. at 377, 347 N.E.2d at 803. 
 478  Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS). 
 479  Id. 
 480  Croslow, at 378, 347 N.E.2d at 804. 
 481  Id. 
 482  177 A.D. 102, 163 N.Y.S. 925. 
 483  Id. at 103, 163 N.Y.S. at 928. 
 484  Id. at 103, 163 N.Y.S. at 926. 
 485  Id. 
 486  Id. 
 487  Major, at 103, 163 N.Y.S. at 926. 
 488  Id. 
 489  Id. at 103, 163 N.Y.S. at 927. 
 490  Id. 
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New York court affirmed, concluding that a power held in several 
grantees could be exercised by the survivor.491  According to the court: 
It is an informing fact that the exercise of the power depended 
upon no conditions, contingencies or limitations.  It was a naked 
power to pay over, without the exercise of any discretion referable to 
any requirement, advantage, or necessity.  It was not to furnish 
support, if needed, or to maintain any state of living.  It was merely 
an unconditional power to do something.492 
It is interesting to note that the court seemed to view 
Richard’s right to terminate the trust as a non-fiduciary power, 
independent of his status as a trustee.  Apparently, the court did not 
believe that Richard owed any fiduciary duty to his son, who had a 
contingent remainder interest under the trust. 
The settlor may also authorize a trustee to modify the terms of 
a trust.  For example, section 808(c) of the Uniform Trust Code 
permits a trustee to modify the terms of a trust when expressly 
authorized to do so in the trust instrument.493  Of course, the power to 
modify may also be limited as illustrated in Rosner v. Caplow.494  In 
1947, Leo and Anna Rosner established irrevocable inter vivos trusts 
for their two daughters, June and Mildred.495  Each daughter was 
named as an income beneficiary with a gift over to her issue.496  The 
trust instrument also created a trust for Anna.497  Leo was sole 
trustee for each of these trusts.498  However, Jacob Fisher and Samuel 
Ecker were named as substitute trustees in the event that Leo died or 
was otherwise unable to serve as trustee.499  Over the years, the 
parties entered into various agreements relating to the trusts.500  In 
1951, Leo, Anna, June, and Mildred granted to Leo the right during 
his lifetime to name other substitute trustees.501  At the time this 
agreement was signed, June was a minor, and the sole remainderman 
was Mildred’s daughter, Stacey.502 
In 1963, Leo resigned as trustee, and appointed Anna and 
                                                   
 491  Id. at 103, 163 N.Y.S. at 927. 
 492  Major, at 103, 163 N.Y.S. at 928. 
 493  UNIF. TRUST CODE § 808(c) (2013). 
 494  105 Misc. 2d. 592, 432 N.Y.S.2d 577 (Sup. Ct. 1980). 
495  Id. at 592, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 579. 
 496  Id.  
 497  Id. 
 498  Id. 
 499  Rosner, at 593, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 579-80. 
 500  Id. at 594, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 580. 
 501  Id.  
 502  Id. 
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Mildred as successor trustees.503  Several months later, June 
purported to “renounce” her interest in her trust in return for a 
cooperative apartment in New York City.504  In 1966, the parties 
entered into another agreement under which the corpus of June’s 
trust was divided into separate trusts for June’s three minor children, 
Jeffrey, Wendy, and Marcey.505  Finally, in 1973, the parties entered 
into another agreement, reinstating June as the beneficiary of her 
former trust.506  Leo died in 1977,507 and in 1978, Anna and Mildred 
agreed to name June as a third trustee.508  Nevertheless, in 1979, 
June brought suit to remove her mother and sister as trustees, and to 
designate herself as a successor trustee.509  June argued that the 1951 
agreement, which purported to give Leo the power to name substitute 
trustees, was invalid because she and her niece, Stacey, were minors 
at the time.510 
The court observed that the settlor of a trust could revoke or 
amend it only if all persons “beneficially interested” consented.511  
Although the court agreed that June did not legally consent to the 
agreement in 1951, it concluded that she had effectively consented 
after reaching her majority by accepting income from the trust for 
many years afterward.512  On the other hand, the court found that the 
1978 agreement was not valid.513  First, it declared that the 
designation of an additional or successor trustee was a modification of 
the trust.514  Since no power to modify was reserved in the original 
trust instrument, it could have only come from the 1951 agreement.515  
However, that agreement only gave the power to modify the trust to 
Leo during his lifetime and not to Anna and Mildred as successor 
trustees.516  Thus, the court held that Leo’s designation of Anna and 
Mildred as successor trustees was valid, but their designation of June 
was not.517 
 
                                                   
503  Id. 
 504  Rosner, at 594, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 580. 
 505  Id. at 595, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 580. 
 506  Id.  at 595, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 580. 
 507  Id.  
 508  Id. at 595-96, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 581. 
 509  Rosner, at 596, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 581. 
 510  Id. at 597, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 581. 
 511  Id. at 597, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 581-82. 
 512  Id. at 598, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 582. 
 513  Id. at 600, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 583. 
 514  Rosner, at 600-01, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 583. 
 515  Id. at 601, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 583. 
 516  Id. at 601, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 583. 
 517  Id. at 601, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 584.  Nor was the statutory provision allowing modification 
available once Leo, one of the settlors, had died.  Id.  
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B. Decanting 
In addition to express modification of the terms of a trust, in 
many states, a trustee can effectively modify a trust by transferring 
the trust corpus to another trust if authorized to do so in the trust 
instrument.518  This practice is known as “decanting,”519 which occurs 
when a trustee, who has discretion to distribute trust property to 
certain beneficiaries, distributes the property to another trust created 
for their benefit instead of distributing the property to them 
outright.520  There are a number of benefits associated with 
decanting.521  Some of the more important reasons to decant include: 
(1) updating trust terms to reflect changes in the law governing the 
trust; (2) modifying the distributive terms of the trust in order to 
address circumstances such as changes in a beneficiary’s financial 
status, marital status, or health; and (3) facilitating GST and other 
tax planning for trust beneficiaries.522 
1. The Common Law Power to Decant 
One of the first courts to consider the validity of decanting was 
the Florida Supreme Court in Phipps v. Palm Beach Trust Co.523  In 
1932, Margarita Phipps created a trust for the benefit of her children 
and their descendants.524  Margarita named her husband, John, as 
individual trustee, and the Palm Beach Trust Company as corporate 
trustee.525  The trust instrument provided that John, “in his sole and 
absolute discretion,” could distribute trust property to any or all of the 
beneficiaries.526  In 1939, John directed the corporate trustee to 
transfer the trust corpus to a new trust, which had slightly different 
provisions.527  The corporate trustee requested the court to determine 
whether the individual trustee had the power to appoint the property 
in further trust.528  The court ruled that John could appoint the trust 
                                                   
 518  Willms, supra note 17, at 37.  
 519  “Decanting” refers to the practice of transferring wine from its original bottle to another 
receptacle in order to remove sediment and other impurities.  See Niendorf, supra note 3, at 
619. 
 520  Medlin, supra note 16, at 94-95. 
 521  Simmons, supra note 19, at 255 (identifying fifteen reasons to decant). 
 522  See William R. Culp, Jr. & Briani Bennett Mellen, Trust Decanting: An Overview and 
Introduction to Creative Planning Opportunities, 45 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 1, 14-15 
(2010-11). 
 523  142 Fla. 782, 196 So. 299 (1940). 
 524  Id. at 783, 196 So. at 300. 
 525  Id. 
 526  Id. at 784, 196, So. at 300. 
 527  Id. at 784, 196 So. at 300.  
 528  Phipps, at 784, 196 So. at 300. 
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property in this manner, and the corporate trustee appealed.529 
The Florida Supreme Court determined that John had a 
special, not a general, power of appointment since he could only 
distribute the trust property to Margarita’s descendants.530  The 
corporate trustee argued that when the power to appoint was special, 
the trustee could only appoint in further trust if the trust instrument 
expressly authorized him to do so.531  However, the court found that 
Margarita “reposed unlimited confidence and discretion” in her 
husband, and “clothed him with absolute power to administer and 
dispose of the trust estate to any one of the named beneficiaries to the 
exclusion of the others.”532  Therefore, the court concluded that the 
trust instrument vested John with the power to create a second trust 
as long as one or more of Margarita’s descendants were made trust 
beneficiaries.533 
In the case of In the Matter of the Estate of Spencer, an Iowa 
court relied on a special power of appointment analysis to uphold a 
trustee’s power to appoint trust property to another trust.534  Unlike 
the Phipps court, the court in Spencer did not require any affirmative 
grant of authority in the trust instrument to appoint in further trust; 
instead, it recognized an implied power to appoint as long as the 
settlor did not “manifest a contrary intent.”535 
A New Jersey appeals court also upheld a trustee’s 
distribution of trust property to a new trust in Wiedenmayer v. 
Johnson.536  In 1944, John Seward Johnson established an inter vivos 
trust for his son, John Seward Johnson, Jr.537  The trust instrument 
authorized the trustees to pay John, Jr. “so much of the net income in 
any year as the trustees in their absolute and uncontrolled discretion 
may deem to be for his best interests.”538  In addition, “whenever in 
their absolute and uncontrolled discretion [the trustees] deem it to be 
for his best interests” they were also permitted to pay over to John, 
Jr. “any or all of the Trust Property.”539  When the trustees agreed to 
distribute the trust corpus to John, Jr. in a new trust, several of his 
                                                   
 529  Id. at 784-85, 196 So. at 300-01. 
 530  Id. at at 786, 196 So. at 301. 
 531  Id. 
 532  Id. at 786, 196 So. at 301. 
 533  Phipps, at 786, 196 So. at 301.   
 534  232 N.W.2d 491 (Iowa 1975). 
 535  Id. at 496. 
 536  106 N.J. Super. 161, 163, 254 A.2d 534, 535 (App. Div. 1969), aff’d per curiam, 55 N.J. 
81, 259 A.2d 465 (1969). 
 537  Id. at 164, 254 A.2d at 535. 
 538  Id. 
 539  Id. 
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minor children, through their guardians ad litem, objected because 
the new trust failed to preserve their contingent remainders under 
the original trust.540 
On appeal, the court observed that the trustees’ power to 
distribute trust property to John, Jr. was limited only by the required 
determination the distribution would be in his “best interests.”541  In 
the court’s view, “the trustees could, to safeguard the son’s best 
interests, condition the distribution upon his setting up a substituted 
trust.”542  Finally, the court dismissed the claims of John, Jr.’s 
children, reasoning that the trustees did not deprive them of any 
rights since their contingent interests would extinguish if the trustees 
exercised their right to distribute the trust property absolutely to 
John, Jr.543  Note that the court in Johnson, unlike those in Phipps 
and Spencer, did not condition the power of a trustee to appoint in 
further trust on the existence of a special power of appointment; 
instead, it concluded that this power was based on the trustee’s 
exercise of a discretionary power to distribute the trust property to a 
beneficiary.544 
Finally, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court recently 
endorsed the concept of decanting by name in Morse v. Kraft.545  In 
1982, Robert and Myra Kraft established a trust and four sub-trusts 
for their four sons (the “1982 Trusts”).546  However, the trust 
instrument provided that only a “disinterested trustee” could make 
distributions from the sub-trusts to the children.547  Richard Morse, 
the sole trustee, proposed to transfer all of the property in the sub-
trusts to new sub-trusts established in accordance with the terms of a 
new master trust (the 2012 Trust).548  This transfer, if permitted, 
would have enabled the sons to serve as trustees with distributive 
powers over their respective sub-trusts.549 
The trustee was concerned that the terms of the 2012 Trust 
would trigger liability under the GST tax.550  This, in turn, depended 
upon whether the 1982 Trust authorized distributions to the 2012 
Trust by the trustee “without the consent or approval of any 
                                                   
 540  Id. at 165, 254 A.2d at 536. 
 541  Wiedenmayer, at 164, 254 A.2d at 535-36. 
 542  Id. at 165, 254 A.2d at 536. 
 543  Id. at 165-66, 254 A.2d at 536. 
 544  See Culp &  Mellen, supra note 522, at 11. 
 545  Morse v. Kraft, 466 Mass. 92, 992 N.E.2d 1021 (2013). 
 546  Id. at 92, 992 N.E.2d at 1022-1023. 
 547  Id. at 93, 992 N.E.2d at 1023. 
 548  Id. at 94, 992 N.E.2d at 1023. 
 549  Id. 
 550  Morse, 466 Mass. at 94-95, 992 N.E.2d at 1023-24. 
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beneficiary or court.”551  The court first observed that donees of a 
nonfiduciary special power of appointment could appoint trust 
property in further trust, provided that the donor did not express a 
contrary intent.552  Examining the language of the 1982 Trust, the 
court determined that it did not expressly authorize the trustee to 
make distributions in further trust.553  On the other hand, the trustee 
was vested with broad discretion insofar as distributions were 
concerned.554  Therefore, the court concluded that there was nothing 
to preclude the trustee from exercising the power to decant from the 
1982 Trust to the 2012 Trust.555 
2. The Statutory Power to Decant 
In 1992, New York became the first state to enact a statute 
that authorized trustees to decant from one trust to another.556  Since 
then, a number of other states have passed legislation to authorize 
decanting.557  Although these statutes are not uniform,558 they do 
address a number of common issues.559  For example, state decanting 
statutes impose different requirements for authorizing trustees to 
decant.  In some states, a trustee cannot decant unless he has the 
power to invade the principal to make distributions.560  Statutes in 
other states permit decanting only if the trustee has the “absolute 
power” to invade the principal,561 while statutes in a third group of 
states allow decanting if the trustee has absolute or more limited 
                                                   
 551  Id. at 95, 992 N.E.2d at 1024 (quoting 26 C.F.R. § 26.2601-1(b)(4)(i)(A)(1)(i) (2012)). 
 552  Id. at 96, 992 N.E.2d at 1025 (citing Loring v. Karri-Davies, 371 Mass. 346, 357 N.E.2d 
11 (1976)). 
 553  Id. at 97, 992 N.E.2d at 1025. 
554  Id. at 98-99, 992 N.E.2d at 1026-27. 
 555  Morse, at 98-99, 992 N.E.2d at 1026-27. 
 556  See Culp & Mellen, supra note 522, at 3. 
 557  See ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.157 (2014); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10819 (2011); DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3528 (2015); 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/16.4 (West 2014); IND. CODE § 
30-4-3-36 (2014); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 386.175 (West 2014); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 
556.115a (2014), 700.7103 (2014), 700.7820a (2014); MO. ANN. STAT. § 456.4-419 (West 
2014); NEV. REV. STAT. § 163.556 (2014); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-B:4-418 (2014); N.Y. 
EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 10-6.6 (McKinney 2014); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36C-8-816.1 
(2014); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5808.18 (West 2014); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 18-4-31 (2014); S.C. 
CODE ANN. § 62-7-816A (2014); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 55-2-15 to 55-2-21 (2014); TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 35-15-816 (West 2014); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 112.071-.089 (West 2013); 
VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-778.1 (West 2014); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-816 (West 2014).  It should 
be noted that the Uniform Trust Code does not specifically authorize decanting.  See 
Simmons, supra note 19, at 263.  
 558  See Niendorf, supra note 3, at 624. 
 559  See generally, William R. Burford, State Decanting Statutes: Tax and Non-Tax Aspects 
of Decanting Irrevocable Trusts, TSUB09-ALI-CLE 35, 37-44 (Sept. 27, 2012). 
 560  See ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.157; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10819; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
12, § 3528; TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-15-816. 
 561  See IND. CODE § 30-4-3-36; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 18-4-31. 
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power to invade the principal.562  Other statutes permit a trustee to 
decant if he has the discretionary power to distribute principal or 
income.563  Finally, a New Hampshire statute authorizes decanting if 
the trustee has the discretionary power to make distributions.564 
Although a trustee’s power to decant varies somewhat under these 
statutes, the common denominator is that in order to decant, the 
trustee must have some discretion to distribute trust income or 
principal to an ascertainable class of beneficiaries. 
Typically, state decanting statutes also place certain 
restrictions on a trustee’s power to decant.  For example, a number of 
statutes provide that a trustee can only create a new trust in favor of 
one or more beneficiaries of the original trust.565  However, in a 
number of states, the second trust can vest a beneficiary with a power 
of appointment whose natural objects were not potential appointees 
under the original trust.566  In addition, statutes in a variety of states 
indicate that by decanting, the trustee can extend the time that the 
property will be held in trust, but not beyond the perpetuities period 
applicable to the original trust.567 
Decanting statutes in certain states prohibit the trustee from 
reducing a beneficiary’s fixed income interest under the original trust 
by decanting trust property to a new trust,568 while others prohibit 
accelerating remainder interests to current beneficial interests as a 
result of decanting.569  In addition, statutes in some states prohibit or 
                                                   
 562  See 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/16.4; N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 10-6.6; OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 5808.18.  
 563  See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 386.175; MO. ANN. STAT. § 456.4-419; NEV. REV. STAT. § 
163.556; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36C-8-816.1; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-2-15; VA. CODE ANN. § 
64.2-778.1. 
 564  See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-B:4-418 (2014).   
 565  See ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.157; 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/16.4; IND. CODE § 30-4-3-36; 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 386.175; MO. ANN. STAT. § 456.4-419; NEV. REV. STAT. § 163.556; N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-B:4-418; N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 10-6.6; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 
36C-8-816.1; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5808.18; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 18-4-31; S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS §§ 55-2-15 to 55-2-21; VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-778.1.   
 566  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3528; 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/16.4; NEV. REV. STAT. § 
163.556; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-B:4-418; N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 10-6.6; 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36C-8-816.1; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5808.18; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 18-4-31; 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-2-15; TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-15-816; VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-778.1.  
 567  See ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.157; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3528; 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. 5/16.4; IND. CODE § 30-4-3-36; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 386.175; N.Y. EST. POWERS & 
TRUSTS Law § 10-6.6; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36C-8-816.1; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5808.18; S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 55-2-20; TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-15-816; VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-778.1.   
 568  See ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.157; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10819; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
12, § 3528; 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/16.4; IND. CODE § 30-4-3-36; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
386.175; MO. ANN. Stat. § 456.4-419; NEV. REV. STAT. § 163.556; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
564-B:4-418; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36C-8-816.1 (2014); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 18-4-31; S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS § 55-2-15 to 55-2-21; TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-15-816; VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-778.1.   
 569  See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36C-8-816.1; VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-778.1. 
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restrict the right to decant property when a beneficiary possesses a 
presently exercisable withdrawal power.570 
A large number of states require that a trustee must give 
written notice to the beneficiaries of the original trust before 
exercising the power to decant.571  In Nevada, the trustee must either 
notify the trust beneficiaries or seek court approval before 
decanting.572  However, in New Hampshire, the trustee need only 
provide notice to those beneficiaries who are charitable entities.573  
Finally, statutes in many states permit a trustee to decant without 
first seeking court approval.574 
3. Fiduciary Duties and Tax Issues 
Although decanting is a useful way to modify the terms of a 
trust, trustees need to proceed with caution.  First of all, a trustee 
acts in a fiduciary capacity when exercising the power to decant.575  A 
number of statutes state that a trustee owes a fiduciary duty to 
beneficiaries of the trust when decanting.576  The South Dakota 
statute specifies that a trustee must determine whether appointing in 
further trust is “necessary and desirable” after taking account of (1) 
the purposes of the original trust, (2) “the terms and conditions of the 
second trust, and (3) the consequences of the distribution.”577  On the 
other hand, an Ohio statute provides that “a trustee who acts 
reasonably and in good faith . . . is presumed to have acted in 
accordance with the terms and purposes of the trust and the interests 
of the beneficiaries.”578  Moreover, it is not clear whether a trustee can 
be held liable for failing to decant.  Several states have declared that 
a trustee’s decision whether to decant is a matter of discretion,579 
while Missouri’s decanting statute explicitly states that a trustee’s 
                                                   
 570  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3528; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-B:4-418.  This 
restriction is probably designed to avoid gift tax liability when certain parties are involved, 
or certain types of property are transferred, when decanting occurs.  See Culp & Mellen, 
supra note 522, at 3.  
 571  See IND. CODE § 30-4-3-36; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 386.175; MO. ANN. STAT. § 456.4-419; 
N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 10-6.6; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36C-8-816.1; OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 5808.18; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 18-4-31; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-2-18; VA. CODE ANN. § 
64.2-778.1. 
 572  See NEV. REV. STAT. § 163.556. 
 573  See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-B:4-418. 
 574  See ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.157; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10819; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
12, § 3528; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 386.175; N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS § 10-6.6; N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 36C-8-816.1; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5808.18; VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-778.1.   
 575  See Culp & Mellen, supra note 522, at 48.  
 576  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3528; MO. ANN. STAT. § 456.4-419; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
564-B:4-418; N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 10-6.6; VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-778.1. 
 577  See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-2-15. 
 578  See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5808.18.  
 579  ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.157(a); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36C-816(b). 
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fiduciary obligations do not impose an affirmative duty to decant.580 
Finally, exercising a power of appointment to transfer 
property from one trust to another may result in increased tax 
liability if not done properly.581  For example, decanting by a trustee 
who is also a beneficiary may result in gift tax liability, unless 
distributions are limited by an ascertainable standard.582  In addition, 
decanting from a trust that is exempt from the GST tax may result in 
loss of exempt status if not done properly.583 
C.  Modification and Termination by a Trust Protector 
A trust protector is a person, other than the settlor or a 
trustee, who is authorized to exercise one or more powers over the 
trust.584  Trust protectors can be traced back to a number of sources, 
including non-trustee functionaries associated with England and 
various Commonwealth countries, officers associated with offshore 
and domestic asset protection trusts, and trust advisors in America 
with supervisory powers over a trustee’s investment decisions.585  A 
majority of jurisdictions in the United States now recognize the legal 
status of trust protectors either through the adoption of the Uniform 
Trust Code586 or the enactment of statutes expressly authorizing their 
use by settlors.587 
Arguably, a settlor can vest a trust protector with the power to 
modify or terminate the trust.588  The Uniform Trust Code states that 
the trust instrument may confer upon a trustee or “other person,” 
such as a trust protector, the power to direct the modification or 
termination of a trust.  Some state statutes, such as Alaska,589 
Arizona,590 Idaho,591 Missouri,592 South Dakota,593 and Wyoming594 
                                                   
 580  MO. ANN. STAT. § 456.4-419. 
 581  See Culp & Mellen, supra note 522, at 16-37; Willms, supra note 17, at 67-80; Diana 
S.C. Zeydel & Jonathan G. Blattmachr, Tax Effects of Decanting — Obtaining and 
Preserving the Benefits, 111 J. TAX’N 288, 291 (2009). 
 582  Treas. Reg, § 25.2511-1(g)(1-2) (1960). 
 583  See generally Willms, supra note 17, at 77-78. 
 584  See MO. ANN. STAT. § 456.8-808 (West 2014). 
 585  See Ausness, supra note 268, at 278-81. 
 586  UNIF. TRUST CODE § 808(b) cmt. (declaring that “[s]ections (b)-(d) ratify the use of trust 
protectors and trust advisors”).  
 587  For citations to these statutes, along with useful comments, see Gideon Rothchild, Trust 
Protectors: What Role Do They Play? Estate Planning in Depth 585, 597 (SS043 ALI-ABA 
(June 12-17, 2011)).  
 588  See Alexander A. Bove, Jr., The Trust Protector: Trusty Watchdog or Expensive Exotic 
Pet? 30 EST. PLAN. 390, 391 (2003); Stewart E. Sterk, Trust Protectors, Agency Costs, and 
Fiduciary Duty, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2761, 2779 (2005-06). 
 589  ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.370(b)(1-4). 
 590  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10818(b)(1-5). 
 591  IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-7-501(6). 
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list the power to modify or terminate a trust (at least in some 
circumstances) as one of the powers that a trust protector may 
exercise when authorized by the trust instrument.  Other statutes are 
less explicit, but appear to permit a trust protector to exercise any 
power expressly mentioned in the trust instrument.595  This would 
seem to include the power to modify or terminate the trust. 
However, there is the question of whether a trust protector is 
subject to any fiduciary duties.  There is some authority to the effect 
that trust advisors in America cannot exercise their powers for their 
own personal benefit.596  There are similar holdings from foreign 
jurisdictions involving trust protectors.597  In addition, the Uniform 
Trust Code declares that power holders (such as trust protectors) are 
presumed to be fiduciaries, at least when exercising the power to 
direct the trustee to do something.598  A number of state statutes also 
impose fiduciary duties on trust protectors.599  However, other 
statutes state that a trust protector shall not be considered a fiduciary 
unless the trust instrument provides otherwise.600  The only appellate 
case to consider whether a trust protector was a fiduciary was Robert 
T. McLean Irrevocable Trust v. Davis, which eventually dismissed the 
trust beneficiary’s claims against the trust protector.601  The court 
concluded that the trust had not suffered any loss as the result of the 
trust protector’s failure to remove a prior trustee.602  Although the 
court indicated that the trust protector owed a fiduciary duty to the 
beneficiary, its observation was merely dictum since it ultimately 
decided the case on causation grounds.603 
Arguably, a trust protector who exercises a discretionary 
power to modify or terminate a trust should be held to the same 
fiduciary standard as a trustee who is exercising the same power.  
                                                   
 592  MO. ANN. STAT. § 456.8-808. 
 593  S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-1B-6. 
 594  WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-710. 
 595  See Philip J. Ruce, The Trustee and the Trust Protector: A Question of Fiduciary Power.  
Should a Trust Protector Be Held to a Fiduciary Standard? 59 DRAKE L. REV. 67, 68 (2010-
11).  
 596  See Stuart v. Wilmington Trust Co., 474 A.2d 121, 123 (Del. 1984). 
 597  See Ausness, supra note 268, at 288-92. 
 598  UNIF. TRUST CODE § 808(d). 
 599  See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-B:12-1202 (2014); 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16.3(e) 
(2015); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.7809 (West 2014); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-711 (West 
2014). 
 600  ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.370(d) (2014); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-1B-1.1 (2014). 
 601  283 S.W.3d 786 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009), aff’d on remand sub nom. Robert T. McLean 
Irrevocable Trust v. Ponder, 418 S.W.3d 482, 486 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013). 
 602  Ponder, at 498. 
 603  Id. at 487, 490, 494, 496. 
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That standard, as articulated in Hammerstein,604 is that a court will 
not overrule a trustee’s discretion unless the trustee “wilfully abuses 
his discretion or acts arbitrarily, fraudulently, dishonestly, or with an 
improper motive.”605  Of course, this is only a default standard; 
presumably, the settlor can subject the trust protector to a higher 
fiduciary standard in the trust instrument. 
D. Summary 
Settlors who wish to avoid the delays and expense of judicial 
modification or termination of their trusts can authorize a trustee or 
trust protector to exercise this power instead.  Trust instruments 
have empowered trustees to terminate trusts for many years606 and 
the Uniform Trust Code also endorses this practice.607  Case law608 
and the Uniform Trust Code609 also permit trustees to modify trust 
terms if they are authorized to do so by trust instrument.  In addition, 
a number of courts and state statutes have recognized the validity of 
decanting, a practice by which a trustee or other power holder is 
allowed to appoint trust property to another trust.610  Finally, the 
settlor may empower a trust protector instead of the trustee to modify 
or terminate a trust.611 
V. THE PROBLEM OF EXCESSIVE DEAD HAND CONTROL 
Settlors often use trusts to maintain some control over their 
property after death.  For example, vesting of property interests may 
be postponed until a beneficiary reaches a certain age; spendthrift 
provisions can restrict alienation; and incentive provisions can 
encourage particular behavior.  However, beneficiaries often consider 
these sorts of restrictions or conditions to be inconvenient or 
unreasonable, especially after the settlor is dead.  For them, 
modification or termination is a means to escape the dead hand’s 
oppressive grasp. 
A. The Conflict Between Deceased Settlors and Living 
Beneficiaries 
If the interests of the deceased settlor and the living trust 
beneficiaries sometimes diverge, then what is the proper balance to 
                                                   
 604  631 S.W.2d 858. 
 605  Id. at 863. 
 606  See, e.g., McManus’ Estate, at 184, 62 A.D.2d at 764; Eckert’s Trust, at 35-36, 258 
N.Y.S.2d at 543; Fishberg, at 3, 285 N.Y.S. at 307; Major, at 102 163 N.Y.S. at 925. 
 607  UNIF. TRUST CODE § 808(c). 
 608  See Rosner, 105 Misc. 2d 592, 432 N.Y.S. 2d 577. 
 609  UNIF. TRUST CODE § 808(c) . 
 610  Medlin, supra note 16, at 94.  
 611  See Ruce, supra note 594, at 68.  
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strike between them?  There appear to be at least three general 
approaches for further consideration.  The first alternative, 
exemplified by Saunders,612 would permit a court to terminate a trust 
at any time with the consent of all of its beneficiaries.613  This rule, 
which is followed in England, treats the interests of the beneficiaries 
as completely superior to those of the settlor, and allows them to 
“overbear and defeat the intention of a testator or settlor”614 whenever 
they choose.  At the other extreme, the traditional American rules on 
modification and termination treat the interests of the settlor as 
paramount and refuse to allow modification or termination if one or 
more of the trust’s material purposes remains to be accomplished.615  
The approaches taken by the Uniform Trust Code and the Third 
Restatement, which relax the Claflin doctrine’s material purpose 
requirement somewhat,616 can be said to occupy a middle ground 
between these two approaches. 
Of course, this debate is part of a larger controversy about 
testamentary dispositions of property in general.  Opponents of dead 
hand control argue that it is undesirable because of imperfect 
information on the part of the deceased donor, the possibility of 
negative externalities, and concerns about intergenerational equity.617  
According to one school of thought, imperfect information, particularly 
about future events and circumstances, may cause donors to make 
dispositions of their property that they would not have made had they 
been better prognosticators.618  Unfortunately, once the donor is dead, 
such decisions cannot be reversed.619  Particular dispositions may also 
result in negative externalities by imposing social costs on others.620  
For example, society may have to support a donor’s dependent 
children when he fails to provide for them after death.621  Another 
concern is the problem of first-generation monopoly.622  As Stephen 
Shavell observes, “[b]y virtue of its priority in time, the present 
generation owns the whole earth and all the things on it.”623  
Consequently, if this generation is allowed to tie up existing property 
well into the future, subsequent generations will have less property of 
                                                   
 612  (1841) 49 Eng. Rep. 282 (Ch). 
 613  See Sitkoff, supra note 58, at 663.  
 614  Goulding v. James, [1997] 2 All E.R. 239 (A.C.) at 247. 
 615  See Unconditional Love, supra note 6, at 468. 
 616  See Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 8, at 1329. 
 617  Kelly, supra note 48, at 1158.  
 618  See Stephen Shavell, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, 70 (2004). 
 619  See Richard A. Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, 699 (8th ed. 2011). 
 620  Kelly, supra note 48, at 1161. 
 621  See Ralph C. Brashier, Protecting the Child from Disinheritance: Must Louisiana Stand 
Alone? 57 LA. L. REV. 1, 3 (1996-97). 
 622  See Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 8, at 1321.  
 623  Shavell, supra note 617, at 71. 
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their own to invest and dispose of as they see fit.624 
Proponents of dead hand control have compelling arguments of 
their own.625  First, permitting some degree of dead hand control 
provides donors with the satisfaction of knowing that they have 
provided financial security to loved ones, and possibly protected them 
from the vicissitudes of life and the consequences of poor judgment.626  
In addition, a donor is likely to work harder to accumulate property if 
he knows that he can exercise some control over its disposition and 
use after death.627  Furthermore, donors will probably possess 
accurate information about the circumstances of prospective donees 
and, when necessary, can include protective devices, such as support 
and spendthrift provisions in their donative instruments.628  Finally, 
allowing dead hand control may enable parents to exercise a benign 
influence over the conduct of their children after death.629 
B. Perpetual or “Dynasty” Trusts 
Allowing property owners to control the use of their property 
after death also gives rise to the question of how long dead hand 
control should be permitted to last.  Most trust instruments direct the 
trustee to pay income to a certain class of individuals, usually the 
children of the settlor.  At the death of the income beneficiaries, the 
trust corpus is then distributed free of trust to a second class of 
beneficiaries, usually the settlor’s grandchildren.  Thus, the settlor 
exercises control over his property for only one generation.630  One 
reason that trusts seldom last for more than one or two generations is 
the Rule Against Perpetuities.  The Rule in its traditional form 
requires that interests not fully vested either become vested or fail to 
vest within the lifetime of a living person plus an additional twenty-
one years.631  Contingents who may exceed that period are considered 
invalid ab initio.632  The use of a “life or lives in being” as a means of 
determining the validity of an interest was based on the notion that 
                                                   
 624  See Lewis M. Simes, Is the Rule Against Perpetuities Doomed? The “Wait and See” 
Doctrine, 52 MICH. L. REV. 179, 191 (1953-54). 
 625  See Kelly, supra note 48, at 1135-38.  
 626  Edward C. Halbach, Jr., An Introduction to Chapters 1-4, DEATH, TAXES, & FAMILY 
PROPERTY 3, 5, (Edward C. Halbach, Jr. ed, West Publ’g Co. 1977). 
 627  See Adam J. Hirsch & William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead Hand, 68 
IND. L.J. 1, 8 (1992-93); Jeffrey E. Stake, Darwin, Donations, and the Illusion of Dead Hand 
Control, 64 TUL. L. REV. 705, 749 (1989-90). 
 628  See Hirsch & Wang, supra note 626, at 12.  
 629  Kelly, supra note 48, at 1137. 
 630  However, in order to avoid the possibility of having to appoint guardians for underage 
beneficiaries, settlors often provide that property will continue to be held in trust until 
members of the second generation reach their majority.   
 631  See John Chipman Gray, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 201, at 191 (4th ed. 1942). 
 632  See Perpetual Trusts, supra note 200, at 600.  
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the settlor could properly assess the capabilities of living persons, but 
could know nothing about unborn persons.633 
In recent years, however, a large number of states have 
abolished or substantially modified the Rule Against Perpetuities, 
thereby enabling a settlor to create multi-generational trusts.  Many 
commentators believe that a change in federal tax legislation is 
responsible for this development.634  In 1986, Congress imposed a tax 
on GSTs that enabled the first generation of beneficiaries, who had 
equitable life estates, to avoid estate tax liability.635  The tax taxes 
GSTs at a rate equivalent to the highest estate tax rate.  However, 
legislation included a $1 million exemption for each transferor, which 
is now over $5 million per transferor.636 Furthermore, if a settlor 
places exempted property into a trust, the property will not be subject 
to GST tax liability until the trust terminates.637  When the GST tax 
legislation was passed in 1986, only Idaho, Wisconsin, and South 
Dakota had abolished the Rule Against Perpetuities.  Therefore, 
legislatures assumed that exempt trusts would terminate, and become 
subject to tax liability, within a generation or two.  Instead, over the 
next three decades almost thirty states abolished or modified the Rule 
Against Perpetuities, thereby allowing trusts to last beyond the period 
allowed by the traditional Rule.  Many wealthy persons, who liked the 
idea of establishing a trust that would last for hundreds of years 
without being subject to GST tax liability, set up trusts in states 
which allowed such trusts to be created.638 
                                                   
 633  See Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 8, at 1309.  Courts later allowed the settlor to 
exercise an additional twenty-one years of control to account for the possibility that some 
beneficiaries might be minors.  Id. 
 634  See, e.g., Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 8, at 1315; Mary Louise Fellows, Why the 
Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax Sparked Perpetual Trusts, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2511, 
2513, 2518-20 (2005-06); Gallanis, supra note 51, at 232-33; Max M. Schanzenbach & 
Robert H. Sitkoff, Perpetuities or Taxes? Explaining the Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 27 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2465, 2467 (2005-06); Perpetual Trusts, supra note 200, at 602-05.  
 635  A tax on generation-skipping transfers was first enacted in 1976.  However, it was 
substantially revised by Congress in the 1986 legislation. See Perpetual Trusts, supra note 
200, at 602.  
 636  Mark L. Ascher, But I Thought the Earth Belonged to the Living, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1149, 
1164 n.77 (2010-11) (citing I.R.C. §§ 2631(c), 2010(c) (2012))(reviewing Lawrence M. 
Friedman, DEAD HANDS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WILLS, TRUSTS, AND INHERITANCE LAW 
(Stanford Univ. Press 2009)).  
 637  See Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 8, at 1313. 
 638  Dukeminier and Krier provide an example of what a tax exempt perpetual trust might 
look like.  The settlor transfers $5 million (or whatever amount is current exempt from GST 
tax liability) to a trust that will pay income to the settlor’s daughter for life.  At the 
daughter’s death, the trust will be divided into separate shares for each of the daughter’s 
children.  Each child receives an income interest in his or her share of the trust.  Upon each 
child’s death, his or her share of the trust will be further divided and held in trust for that 
child’s issue per stirpes.  This process of further dividing shares of the trust will continue for 
as long as state law permits.  If one line of the settlor’s descendants runs out, that share will 
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However, trusts of such long duration present a number of 
challenges to efficient trust administration.639  Lack of flexibility is an 
obvious concern.640  A wise settlor can minimize this difficulty by 
empowering the trustee or a trust protector to modify the trust in 
response to changing circumstances.  Otherwise, those who seek to 
modify a perpetual trust will have to rely on equitable deviation.  
Another problem is the proliferation of beneficiaries that will 
inevitably occur over time.641  If each beneficiary’s interest is divided 
among his heirs at his death, the number of beneficiaries will 
substantially increase after several generations, making trust 
administration increasingly difficult.642 
Shortly before his death, Jesse Dukeminier and his co-author, 
James Krier, proposed a number of statutory “default rules” to 
address some of the problems associated with perpetual trusts.643  
One alternative was to enact a statute that automatically terminated 
a trust after a certain period of time.644  This would place an absolute 
time limit on the duration of trusts and, unlike the traditional Rule 
Against Perpetuities, would deal with the duration problem directly 
instead of relying on lives in being and vesting to limit duration.  A 
second approach was to limit the power to modify or terminate a trust 
for one generation, but freely allow it by later generations of 
beneficiaries.645  This approach would involve the enactment of a 
statute that allows a court to terminate or modify the trust, after all 
of the income beneficiaries alive at the creation of the trust are dead, 
in order to benefit the next generation of income beneficiaries.646  
Presumably, a court will still have the power to terminate or modify a 
trust while the first generation of beneficiaries are still alive, but it 
would have to abide by the more restrictive requirements of the 
Claflin Doctrine, the Uniform Trust Code, or the Third Restatement. 
                                                   
be divided among the remaining branches of the family.  See Jesse Dukeminier & James E. 
Krier, The Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1303, 1315-18 (2003).  
639  In addition, some commentators have pointed out, state prohibitions against 
“perpetuities,” such as that found in the North Carolina constitution, raise questions about 
the validity of Perpetual Trusts.  See Steven J. Horowitz & Robert H. Sitkoff, 
Unconstitutional Perpetual Trusts, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1769, 1821-22 (2014). 
 640  Daniel B. Kelly, Restricting Testamentary Freedom: Ex Ante Versus Ex Post 
Justifications, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 1125, 1179 (2013-14). 
 641  See Perpetual Trusts, supra note 200, at 625.  
 642  Ascher, supra note 636, at 1161-62.  Professor Ascher estimates that the average settlor 
might have as many as 450 descendants 150 years after establishing a perpetual trust.  Id. 
at 1161. 
 643  See Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 8, at 1340-41.  As Professor Tate points out, these 
proposed rules are mandatory, not permissive.  See Perpetual Trusts, supra note 200, at 610.  
 644  Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 8, at 1340. 
 645  Id. at 1340-41. 
 646  Id. at 1341. 
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Dukeminier and Krier’s third statutory proposal would vest 
each second-generation income beneficiary with a special power to 
appoint his share of trust property during life or by will to anyone 
except himself, his creditors, or his estate.647  The donee of this power 
could terminate the trust by appointing the entire trust corpus and 
could effectively modify the trust by appointing the property in 
further trust.648  A fourth statutory proposal would give the trustee 
the power by statute to modify or terminate the trust.649 
C. Limiting Unreasonable Dead Hand Control 
Dukeminier and Krier have identified a number of problems 
with perpetual trusts, including first-generation monopoly, 
inflexibility, and unreasonable duration.650  The inflexibility problem 
can easily be solved by allowing beneficiaries at some point to modify 
the administrative and distributive terms of the trust with or without 
court approval.  The problem of unreasonable duration and attendant 
dead hand control can be addressed by placing some sort of time limit 
on the duration of private trusts.  For example, states that have 
abolished the Rule Against Perpetuities could reinstate it.  Another 
approach is to place a fixed time period, such as 100 years, on the 
duration of any private trust.  Finally, states may adopt some version 
of the Dukeminier and Krier proposal and limit the temporal scope of 
dead hand control to the first generation of beneficiaries.651  Limiting 
the duration of a trust could also address the problem of first-
generation monopoly. 
Assuming that a trust can be terminated involuntarily, a 
vexing question remains unanswered: to whom should the trust 
property be distributed upon termination?  Consider the following 
three examples.  First, assume that the settlor vests his children with 
an income interest with a gift over to each income beneficiary’s 
children per stirpes.  How will the trust property be distributed?  
There are a number of possibilities.  If the settlor is barred from 
deciding who gets his property after the deaths of the first-generation 
                                                   
 647  Id. 
 648  Id.  A variant on this third proposal would vest income beneficiaries with a power, 
limited by an ascertainable standard relating to health, education, support or maintenance, 
to withdraw principal for their own benefit.  Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 8, at 1341. 
 649  Id. 
 650  See id. at 1321-28.  
 651  The term generation, as I am using it, does not necessarily mean a biological 
generation, but rather it refers to successive classes of beneficiaries.  Thus, the first group of 
beneficiaries who receive a present interest in the trust would constitute the first 
generation.  While in most cases, this class of beneficiaries would be made up of children of 
the settlor, it could be composed of children and grandchildren or some other biological 
mixture.  The first group of beneficiaries to take after the death of first-generation 
beneficiaries (remaindermen) make up the second generation and so on. 
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beneficiaries, then the gift over would be void and the trust property 
would revert to the settlor’s estate.  This result not only makes little 
sense, but it may result in the trust corpus being included in the 
settlor’s gross estate for estate tax purposes.  A better alternative 
would be to distribute the property free of trust to the heirs of the 
income beneficiaries, not as remaindermen, but as beneficiaries under 
the statute.652  Finally, the last and best approach would be to simply 
honor the settlor’s wishes and uphold the validity of the remainder to 
the settlor’s grandchildren.653  Likewise, if the settlor specified that at 
the death of the last income beneficiary, the trust principal was to be 
distributed to the grandchildren per capita instead of per stirpes, that 
distributional formula should be honored as well. 
But consider the example of a perpetual trust where there is 
an infinite succession of income interests.  What happens to the trust 
property when the first-generation beneficiaries die?  Unlike the first 
example, the settlor in this case has not made a gift over free of trust.  
Instead, if the terms of the trust were upheld, the next generation of 
beneficiaries would only have an income interest.  However, the 
statute directs that at this point the trust property must be 
distributed free of trust.  Once again, there are several options.  One 
possibility is to vest each first-generation income beneficiary with a 
special power of appointment to appoint a share of the trust property 
by will to anyone except himself, his creditors, or his estate.654  The 
amount of property subject to appointment is based on the number of 
persons in the class of first-generation beneficiaries.  Thus, if the first-
generation income beneficiaries consisted of the settlor’s four children, 
each child is allowed to appoint one-fourth of the trust corpus, with 
the beneficiary’s heirs being designated as takers in default.  Finally, 
the approach that seems most consistent with the settlor’s intent is 
converting the interest of second-generation beneficiaries from an 
income interest to an absolute one.  In other words, the intended 
beneficiaries remain the same, but the nature of their interest is 
changed.  As in the previous example, the settlor is allowed to 
determine who gets the trust property when the first-generation 
beneficiaries die, but the distribution is made free of trust. 
The third example involves discretionary trusts.  In such 
cases, the beneficiaries are not entitled to any fixed amount of income 
or principal.  Of course, it does not matter that first-generation 
                                                   
 652  This might be roughly analogous to an anti-lapse statute that makes a substitute gift 
when the original gift lapses.  However, in this example, the gift to the remaindermen 
lapses not because they are dead, but because the statute has deprived the settlor of the 
power to make it. 
 653  Notice that the class of takers in the second option (heirs) is greater than the class of 
takers in the third option. 
 654  See Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 8, at 1341.  
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beneficiaries had a mere expectancy, as long as the remainder 
interest is not also subject to the trustee’s discretion.  As in the first 
example, the trust property can be distributed free of trust to the 
remaindermen.  However, the situation becomes more complicated 
with certain types of perpetual trusts where distributions to 
successive generations of beneficiaries are also subject to the trustee’s 
discretion.  In such cases, the best approach is to distribute the trust 
property pro rata and free of trust to second-generation beneficiaries 
provided for in the trust instrument. 
D. A Proposed Solution to the Problem of the Dead 
Hand 
Balancing the interests of dead settlors and living 
beneficiaries is a task that would challenge even the great Sherlock 
Holmes.  Unfortunately, since he is not available, I will have to tackle 
this problem on my own.  However, before doing so, I would like to 
start with a few basic assumptions.  First, the interests of both 
settlors and beneficiaries are legitimate and are entitled to some 
recognition.  Therefore, whatever rule emerges must balance the 
interests of both parties.  Second, there is a need to limit the duration 
of dead hand control.  Accordingly, at some point in time effective 
control over the trust property must pass from the settlor to the 
beneficiaries and the best way to accomplish this is to allow 
beneficiaries at some point to terminate the trust if they wish to do so. 
With that in mind, I propose the enactment of a statute that 
would limit the power to modify or terminate a trust for one 
generation, but freely allow it by later generations of beneficiaries 
who have reached their majority.  This approach is based on 
Dukeminier and Krier’s first proposal, and recognizes the settlor’s 
right to control the trust property during the lives of persons who are 
personally known to him, but not otherwise.655  The statute would 
read as follows: 
If an irrevocable or testamentary trust does not provide for the 
distribution of the trust principal outright and free of trust at the 
death of the last member of the first generation of beneficiaries 
eligible to receive income or principal from the trust, each adult 
member of the succeeding class of beneficiaries shall have the power 
to direct the trustee to distribute his or her share of the trust 
principal outright and free of trust at any time and without court 
approval. 
In addition, those members of the succeeding class of 
beneficiaries who do not choose to terminate their interest in the trust 
                                                   
 655  Id. at 1340. 
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may direct the trustee to place their share of the trust principal in a 
separate sub-trust that is subject to different terms and conditions.  
The right to modify or terminate their interest in a trust shall apply 
to all subsequent beneficiaries as long as the trust remains in 
existence. 
When a trust beneficiary exercises the right to receive his or 
her interest in the trust principal outright or to direct its transfer to a 
separate trust, in the absence of a method or formula for calculating 
the beneficiary’s share in the will or trust instrument itself, the 
beneficiary’s share shall be based on the law of intestacy if the 
beneficiary is related to the prior generation’s class of beneficiaries.  If 
not, the beneficiary’s share shall consist of a pro rata amount based 
on the number of beneficiaries in the class of which the beneficiary is 
a member. 
Implicit in the foregoing statutory proposal is the assumption 
that the first-generation beneficiaries are still able to seek judicial 
modification or termination of the trust, but they have to satisfy 
whatever requirements are applicable to modification or termination.  
In addition, the statute does not force the beneficiaries to terminate 
the trust when the last of the first-generation beneficiaries dies; 
rather, they are free, individually or collectively, to modify the 
administrative or distributive terms of the trust if they choose.  
Finally, the right to terminate or modify the trust is individual, not 
collective.  Each second-generation (or later) beneficiary can take his 
share out of the trust at any time or transfer it to a sub-trust with 
different terms and conditions. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
It is sometimes desirable to modify or even terminate 
irrevocable trusts.  This is particularly true of perpetual trusts that 
can potentially last for centuries.  In the past, it was difficult for 
beneficiaries to modify or prematurely terminate irrevocable trusts 
because courts felt constrained to carry out the deceased settlor’s 
intent as embodied in the trust instrument.  This led to a number of 
problems, including the lack of flexibility.  Unless the settlor was 
prescient enough to give the trustee or trust protector the power to 
modify or terminate the trust, unforeseen circumstances could defeat 
the settlor’s estate plan or interfere with efficient administration of 
the trust.  Traditional restrictions on modification and termination 
also enabled dead hand control to last for an unreasonable length of 
time.  The Uniform Trust Code and the Third Restatement liberalized 
the rules on modification and termination somewhat, but arguably did 
not go far enough.  Inspired by the work of Dukeminier and Krier, I 
have developed a statutory proposal that would allow deceased 
settlors to maintain control over trust property during the lives of the 
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first generation of beneficiaries, but would allow subsequent 
generations of beneficiaries to modify or terminate a trust without 
judicial approval. 
 
